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INTRODUCTION
The 2017 tax legislation1 introduced significant new preferences2 for business income and a new conversation on tax reform. The legislation reduced the top corporate rate to 21%3
and introduced the new Section 199A deduction for qualifying
business income earned through “pass-throughs.”4 Many commentators criticized the overall distributional effects of these
changes—which disproportionately benefitted taxpayers with
the highest incomes—and the flawed design of the pass-

1. Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017) [hereinafter The 2017 Tax
Legislation].
2. By “preference” this Article refers to the fact that the 2017 legislation
generally taxes business income earned by the highest income taxpayers at
lower rates than it taxes ordinary individual income subject to the top marginal rates. See infra notes 103–05 and accompanying text.
3. The 2017 Tax Legislation, supra note 1, § 13001 (codified at I.R.C § 11
(2017)). In this Article, unless otherwise specified, the term “corporation” refers to an entity taxed under § 11 and subchapter C of the Internal Revenue
Code, and the terms “corporate rate” and “corporate system” similarly refer to
the applicable rules under subchapter C. See also infra notes 48–52 and accompanying text (describing the entity classification rules).
4. The 2017 Tax Legislation, supra note 1, § 11001 (codified at I.R.C.
§ 199A (2017)). Of course, the 2017 tax legislation also introduced many other
changes beyond the scope of this Article. See infra note 80. This Article focuses
in particular on changes in the 2017 tax legislation affecting the taxation of
business income earned by high income taxpayers, and the different tax reduction opportunities available in the corporate and pass-through systems. See
infra Part I.B.
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through deduction, but tacitly accepted or even praised the corporate rate cut as a response to international pressures.5
These changes also prompted renewed calls for progressive
tax reforms, to counteract the regressive effects of the 2017 legislation and to increase the share of the tax burden paid by the
wealthy. For example, in early 2019, recently elected Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez proposed a 70% top individual income tax rate on the highest-income taxpayers.6 Leading progressive thinkers defended the proposal, arguing that a
higher rate in this range would maximize revenues from the
wealthiest taxpayers7 and address economic inequality.8
This Article bridges these conversations on the 2017 legislation’s new preferences for business income and the future of
progressive tax reform and introduces a theoretical framework
for understanding their interaction. In particular, this Article
reassesses these conversations in light of what it terms “the
progressivity ratchet”—a path dependence in the structure of
the tax system whereby the tax treatment of certain portions of
the income tax base can determine the degree of progressivity
across the income tax system, measured in terms of net taxes

5. See infra Part I.C.1.
6. See Veronica Stracqualursi, Ocasio-Cortez Suggests 70% Tax for
Wealthy To Fund Climate Change Plan, CNN POLITICS (Jan. 4, 2019, 10:57
AM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/04/politics/Alexandria-ocasio-cortez-tax
-climate-change-plan/index.html [https://perma.cc/P28U-FTLM]. This change
would represent a significant increase from the top marginal rate at the time
of approximately 40%. I.R.C. §§ 1(a)–(d), (j), 1411 (net investment income tax),
3101(b), 3111(b) (Medicare payroll taxes).
7. See Paul Krugman, Opinion, The Economics of Soaking the Rich, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 5, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/05/opinion/alexandria
-ocasio-cortez-tax-policy-dance.html. As Krugman notes, an approximately
70% top rate would be consistent with the revenue-maximizing rate calculated
by some leading economists and the top federal income tax rate in prior decades. Id.; see also Peter Diamond & Emmanuel Saez, The Case for a Progressive Tax: From Basic Research to Policy Recommendations, 25 J. ECON. PERSP.
165, 171 (2011) (calculating a revenue-maximizing rate of 73% using their preferred parameters); Christina D. Romer & David H. Romer, The Incentive Effects of Marginal Tax Rates: Evidence from the Interwar Era, 6 AM. ECON. J.:
ECON. POL’Y 242, 269 (2014) (calculating a revenue-maximizing rate of 74%
based on responsiveness to tax rates during the inter-war era).
8. See, e.g., Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Opinion, Alexandria
Ocasio-Cortez’s Tax Hike Idea Is Not About Soaking the Rich: It’s About Curtailing Inequality and Saving Democracy, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/22/opinion/ocasio-cortez-taxes.html.

1502

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[104:1499

paid by those at the top relative to others.9 The progressivity
ratchet suggests a different assessment of the corporate rate
cut and the new pass-through deduction from how these changes have been typically assessed in the literature to date, and
explains how these changes will obstruct proposals for future
progressive tax reform. In particular, this Article argues why
both the corporate rate reduction and the pass-through deduction should be understood as core structural failings of the 2017
legislation which will limit the progressive potential of the income tax system.
The progressivity ratchet begins with familiar analysis
from the literature on optimal tax design. One basic principle,
which this Article terms the “neutrality principle,” provides
that policymakers should tax close substitutes—goods or activities where an increase in the price of one induces a shift to the
other10—similarly to minimize taxpayer avoidance responses
that will result in revenue loss and efficiency costs.11
This Article expands on this traditional analysis in the
public finance literature to explain when the introduction of a
9. The term “ratchet” refers generally to a device that “engages to prevent reverse motion.” Ratchet, SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (6th
ed. 2007). In this case, the device would be preferences for business income
introduced by the 2017 legislation and the reverse motion would be a more
progressive system that raises more revenue from the wealthiest taxpayers.
As described infra in Part III.A, the ratchet can also operate in reverse,
whereby higher taxes on a portion of the base can enable progressive taxation
on other portions of the tax base. This Article focuses on the progressivity
ratchet’s role in the federal income tax, although the same analysis could also
be extended to other tax instruments.
10. See HARVEY S. ROSEN & TED GAYER, PUBLIC FINANCE 330–36 (9th ed.
2010) (explaining how taxation on one good can induce shifting to another).
11. See, e.g., David A. Weisbach, An Efficiency Analysis of Line Drawing
in the Tax Law, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 71, 71 (2000) (“[L]ines should be drawn so
that a transaction or item is taxed like its closest substitutes.”). This principle
traces back to the classic finding by Frank Ramsey on the optimal tax rates on
different commodities, which will depend upon the degree to which taxpayers
substitute between higher and lower taxed commodities. See generally F. P.
Ramsey, A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation, 37 ECON. J. 47 (1927).
Ramsey concludes in part that “rival” commodities should be taxed “such as to
leave unaltered the proportions in which they are consumed.” Id. at 59. Among
other implications, this framework suggests that close substitutes should face
similar tax rates. Ramsey’s commodity tax analysis can also be applied to activities in an income tax facing differential rates. Cf. Weisbach, supra, at 75
(“Although the motivation behind this paper is the income tax, the structure of
this problem is similar to the standard optimal commodity tax problem.”).
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new preference in response to an initial preference either mitigates or compounds tax avoidance opportunities generated by
the initial preference (and thereby the effect of the progressivity ratchet) and highlights the first-order importance of the legal rules defining the new preference.12 The systemic impact of
a new preference—such as the new business tax preferences in
the 2017 legislation—will depend on whether it increases opportunities for taxpayers to avoid higher taxes on other portions of the base, and more generally whether it violates the
neutrality principle. If an initial preference cannot be eliminated, the neutrality principle suggests that a second tax preference may be desirable to the minimize the revenue loss and tax
avoidance resulting from the initial preference.13 This would be
the case if the rules defining the new preference effectively target income that would otherwise shift to the preexisting preference and the second preference can instead tax that income at a
higher rate.14 In that case, adding a second preference (or more)
may be more desirable than just one, as the second preference
may have the effect of taxing close substitutes more neutrally
and preventing substitution toward the lowest taxed category.
Adding a poorly targeted new preference, in contrast, will compound the effect of the initial preference and increase the efficiency costs and revenue loss resulting from tax avoidance.15
In the traditional framework, the primary problem with introducing a poorly targeted preference would simply be the increased efficiency costs from raising revenue. While this effect
may be independently undesirable, this Article describes the
potentially more significant implications of this analysis for
policymakers desiring to increase the progressivity of the tax
system—and thereby to raise more revenue from the wealthiest

12. See infra Part II.B.
13. See infra Part II.B.
14. See discussion infra Part II.B.1; cf. Weisbach, supra note 11, at 77 (describing how, in the presence of one distortionary tax, it can be efficiency enhancing to add a second distortionary tax which reduces the distortionary effects of the first tax).
15. This Article’s conceptual framework explaining the proper analysis of
preferences introduced in response to other preferences can be applied broadly
when analyzing possible tax reforms. The discussion in this Article focuses on
applying this framework to evaluate proposals to raise rates on high income
taxpayers and the business preferences that disproportionately benefited them
in the 2017 legislation. See infra notes 160–61 and accompanying text.
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taxpayers16—when they face certain political constraints on
how they can progressively raise additional revenue. This analysis suggests that the introduction of greater opportunities for
tax avoidance can generate the progressivity ratchet, which can
in turn limit policymakers to less progressive outcomes if they
do not reverse the tax preferences allowing the new avoidance
opportunities.17
Specifically, this Article describes how the progressivity
ratchet can result from the interaction of greater opportunities
for tax avoidance with one or more of three related background
constraints policymakers may face in progressively taxing the
wealthy.18 The first possible constraint arises to the extent policymakers are concerned with the efficiency costs from taxing
the wealthy (the “efficiency cost constraint”).19 In that case, policymakers may determine to collect less tax revenue from the
wealthy than they would otherwise, if additional revenue entails a higher efficiency cost as the wealthy incur costs to avoid
the rate increases. A second possible constraint arises when
policymakers face political obstacles to increasing progressivity
by simply raising the top statutory rates (the “salience of tax
rates constraint”).20 In this case, greater opportunities for tax
avoidance will reduce the revenue collected at the chosen top
rate. A final possible constraint similarly arises if policymakers
choose to tax the wealthy at the revenue-maximizing rate (the
“revenue maximizing rate constraint”).21 In this case as well,
greater opportunities for tax avoidance will reduce the revenue
collected at this maximum rate.
These constraints may be driven by the preferences of constituents, the independent preferences of the policymakers, or
some combination thereof. Regardless of their source, the constraints link legal rules that give greater opportunities for tax

16. For a discussion of why a more progressive tax system may be desirable, see infra notes 278–82 and accompanying text.
17. See infra Part IV.C.
18. This Article’s framework does not seek to comprehensively describe all
the ways greater tax avoidance may affect progressivity, but it is meant to lay
out plausible conditions under which a violation of the neutrality principle
that leads to greater tax avoidance will undermine progressivity.
19. See infra Part III.A.1.
20. See infra Part III.A.2.
21. See infra Part III.A.3.
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planning to the outcome of less revenue in the end being collected from taxpayers at the top of the distribution.
When policymakers face any of these three constraints, the
tax treatment of certain portions of the tax base can have systemic consequences for overall progressivity in the tax system.
The progressivity ratchet can operate in either direction: higher
taxes on a portion of the tax base can enable greater overall
progressivity—after taking into account the effects elsewhere
in the system—whereas new preferences for a portion of the tax
base can constrain overall progressivity. However, while the
ratchet can operate in either direction, this Article focuses on
the case of the 2017 legislation where a new preferences in the
tax system—the corporate rate reduction or Section 199A—
constrain the progressive potential overall of the tax system, by
undermining effectiveness of higher taxes on other portions of
the tax base.
This framework implies a different assessment of the business tax changes in the 2017 tax legislation than is commonly
found in the literature to date. Proponents of the corporate rate
cut argued that it was necessary to achieve closer neutrality
with falling foreign rates and to stop U.S. multinational corporations (MNCs) from shifting profits and investment to lower
tax foreign jurisdictions.22 In that case, the initial preference is
the lower taxes foreign jurisdictions imposed on mobile income,
and the new preference, introduced in response to this initial
preference, is the corporate rate cut. Many commentators consequently justified the corporate rate cut as a desirable response to pressures on the international tax system.23
22. For instance, the House Republican leadership justified a large corporate rate cut as bringing the United States rate more in line with other countries. See GOP, A BETTER WAY: OUR VISION FOR A CONFIDENT AMERICA 24
(2016) [hereinafter GOP, A BETTER WAY], https://www.novoco.com/sites/
default/files/atoms/files/ryan_a_better_way_policy_paper_062416.pdf [https://
perma.cc/T2RC-WY49] (asserting that the average OECD corporate tax rate
today is 24.8% while the U.S corporate tax rate remains at 35%); see also DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, DECODING THE U.S. CORPORATE TAX 168–69 (2009) (describing competition for reported profits and actual investment as the two justifications that advocates offered for lowering the corporate tax rate); Nigel Chalk
et al., The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act: An Appraisal 6 (IMF, Working Paper No.
WP/18/185, 2018) (“[T]he reduction simply restores the U.S. to the relative position it had in the early 1990s, at around the OECD norm.”).
23. For academic commentary justifying the corporate rate cut as a desirable response to pressures on the international system, see, for example, Mi-
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This Article’s framework explains, however, why these
changes to the corporate system violated the neutrality principle and are likely, if not reversed, to increase the efficiency
costs from raising additional revenue. The claimed benefits of a
lower corporate rate—in reducing profit shifting and increasing
domestic investment24—are likely small relative to the new avenues for tax avoidance that the corporate rate cut generated.
In this respect, the corporate rate reduction may be understood
as a core structural failing of the 2017 legislation.

chael J. Graetz, Foreword—The 2017 Tax Cuts: How Polarized Politics Produced Precarious Policy, 128 YALE L.J.F. 315, 320 (2018) (noting the importance of the international competition for profits and concluding that “a
significantly lower corporate rate has been long overdue, and raising it would
be a mistake”); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, How Terrible Is the New Tax Law?: Reflections on TRA17 5 (Univ. Mich. Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 18-002,
2018) (“On the corporate side, the main change is a long overdue reduction of
the rate to 21% . . . .”); Chalk et al., supra note 22, at 5 (“Most observers regard
a cut in the statutory rate of corporation tax as long overdue.”). Other commentators did not necessarily embrace the corporate rate cut, but also did not
prominently target it for reversal, as they do for other changes in the 2017 legislation. For instance, Jared Bernstein, a leading progressive economic advisor
and commentator, wrote a list of tax changes that progressives should consider in addition to raising the top individual income tax rate, and it included
eliminating the pass-through deduction but not raising the corporate rate.
Jared Bernstein, Building on Ocasio-Cortez: More Progressive Ways To Raise
Much-Needed Tax Revenues, WASH. POST (Jan. 16, 2019), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/01/16/building-ocasio-cortez-more
-progressive-ways-raise-much-needed-tax-revenues/?utm_term=
.748fbdb27694. Some politicians—although few academics—then justified Section 199A as an additional preference necessary to preserve neutrality between domestic corporate and pass-through income in light of the corporate
rate cut. See, e.g., 163 CONG. REC. S7674 (2017) (statement of Sen. Portman)
(defending the pass-through deduction as “try[ing] to have some more parity
between the pass-through companies and the so-called C corporations”); Press
Release, Ron Johnson, U.S. Senator, Johnson Statement on Current Tax Reform Proposals (Nov. 5, 2017) [hereinafter Sen. Johnson Press Release],
https://www.ronjohnson.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2017/11/johnson
-statement-on-current-tax-reform-proposals [https://perma.cc/G5CN-TRER]
(“[I]t is important to maintain the domestic competitive position and balance
between large publicly traded C corporations and ‘pass-through entities.’”); see
also SCOTT GREENBERG & NICOLE KAEDING, TAX FOUND., REFORMING THE
PASS-THROUGH DEDUCTION 2 (2018), https://files.taxfoundation.org/
20180621095652/Tax-Foundation-FF593.pdf [https://perma.cc/BMZ8-HEGS]
(“Supporters of the deduction argue that it . . . helps put the pass-through sector on an equal footing with the largest multinational corporations.”).
24. See infra Part IV.A.
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A second strain of commentary—to which we contributed—
criticized the 2017 legislation, and particularly the design of
Section 199A, for the many new “tax games” that it would invite.25 This Article provides the conceptual framework to understand why the provision violates the neutrality principle,
and, thus, likely compounds the progressivity ratchet. The Article also explains how Section 199A is, to a significant degree,
a symptom of the problem generated by the corporate rate cut,
rather than a unique flaw in the legislation.26 At the very least,
the corporate rate reduction and Section 199A both reflect a
similar mistake: Congress’s failure to properly apply the neutrality principle.
The consequences of these mistargeted preferences are not
limited to their regressive effects and their incentives to costly
tax planning—both design flaws that have received attention in
the literature so far, particularly in the case of Section 199A.27
More importantly, these changes are likely to constrain future
progressive reforms unless they are reversed.28 This path de25. See, e.g., David Kamin et al., The Games They Will Play: Tax Games,
Roadblocks, and Glitches Under the 2017 Tax Legislation, 103 MINN. L. REV.
1439 (2019) (detailing a range of tax planning maneuvers possible under the
new law including Section 199A); Daniel Shaviro, Evaluating the New U.S.
Pass-Through Rules, 218 BRITISH TAX REV. 49, 51 (2018) (“The pass-through
rules stand front and centre in illustrating both the 2017 Act’s sloppiness and
its lack of principle.”).
26. See infra Part IV.B.
27. See infra Part I.C.1.
28. Early reactions to Representative Ocasio-Cortez’s proposal to raise the
top individual rate have generally underappreciated how the changes to the
business tax system in the 2017 legislation would obstruct this reform. See infra notes 283–86 and accompanying text. The Penn Wharton Budget Model
estimates that 35% of ordinary income earned by those with adjusted gross
income above $500,000 came from pass-throughs before the 2017 legislation.
E-mail from John A. Ricco, Senior Analyst, Penn Wharton Budget Model, to
David Kamin, Professor of Law, N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law (Feb. 13, 2019, 1:14
PM EST) (on file with authors) [hereinafter Feb. 13 Ricco E-mail]. If Congress
raises the individual rates but preserves the low corporate rate, much of this
individual income could shift to the corporate tax system. See infra Part IV.C.
Commentators have warned of the general threat that a corporate rate cut
could present to progressive taxation. For instance, Professor Daniel Shaviro
has cautioned that lowering the corporate rate could undermine the progressivity of the individual income tax as taxpayers shift their income—and particularly their labor income—from the individual to the corporate system. See
SHAVIRO, supra note 22, at xii–xiii (“[A] large gap between corporate and individual rates is a potential tax-planning bonanza for taxpayers who can shift
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pendency in the tax system—potentially setting the country on
a course toward a less progressive fiscal system over the longterm—could be the more lasting legacy of the 2017 legislation
and these business tax preferences. This Article concludes by
considering some of the possible avenues for policymakers to
“reverse the ratchet” and enable future progressive reforms.
One direction is to simply revert to the prior relationship between the individual and corporate systems, which generally
penalized the corporate form and reserved the corporate system
for companies requiring access to public equity markets.29 This
approach, while it has received little support so far in the literature, is likely to be more desirable, and less costly, than the
tax structure resulting from the 2017 legislation.30 This Article’s framework also contextualizes a range of alternative reforms proposed in the prior literature that could break the
ratchet by improving the targeting of new preferences or by
eliminating initial preferences in the tax system, and suggests
how policymakers can weigh these alternatives.31
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I
begins by describing key features of the business tax system before 2017, the key changes in the 2017 legislation, and some of
the most salient assessments of these changes in the literature
to date. Part II then builds upon the basic neutrality principle
to explain when introduction of a new preference does or does
not increase the efficiency of raising additional revenue, with a
particular focus on how well the legal rules defining the new
preference target those eligible for the initial preference. Part
III extends this analysis and introduces the idea of the “protheir income into a corporate entity and avoid the second layer of tax. It also
raises serious questions about fitting a lower corporate rate into an overall
system that may still be intended to distribute tax burdens progressively.”);
see also infra note 143 (summarizing various opinions on corporate tax policy).
This Article builds on this prior work by first contextualizing the trade-offs
from a corporate rate cut within this Article’s neutrality framework focused on
the legal rules defining tax preferences, and then explaining why both the corporate rate cut and Section 199A are misguided attempts to pursue neutrality
in the tax system in light of this framework.
29. See infra Part IV.D.1.
30. As described infra notes 309–11 and accompanying text, this approach
could still address international pressures in other ways, such as through expanded base protection measures reducing the ability of corporations to substitute across that margin.
31. See infra Part III.B.3.
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gressivity ratchet,” explaining how a poorly targeted new preference can, under several plausible conditions, lead to policymakers to choose less progressivity overall. Part IV then reassesses the 2017 legislation in light of this framework and
explains how its mistargeted business tax preferences, including the corporate rate cut, will obstruct future progressive tax
reform. Part IV then considers possible options to “reverse the
ratchet” and how to evaluate them.
I. BUSINESS TAXATION AND THE 2017 TAX
LEGISLATION
This Part describes the state of the tax system under prior
law, and then reviews the motivations behind the business tax
preferences in the 2017 legislation, the key features of these
changes, and prevalent early assessments of these changes in
the literature to date.
A. THE CORPORATE AND PASS-THROUGH SYSTEMS UNDER
PRIOR LAW
The federal income tax offers two systems for taxing business income: through either a corporation or a pass-through.
Scholars have long debated the desirability of using two systems rather than one and the wisdom of a separate corporate
tax.32 Perhaps the strongest justification for the entity-level
corporate tax is the administrative convenience from taxing
large, publicly-traded companies with frequent changes in
ownership at the entity level, rather than attempting to attribute the entity’s profits to the individual owners each year. By
contrast, smaller privately-held businesses might not require
entity-level taxation and can be taxed more easily as passthroughs at the level of the individual owners.33 The discussion
32. For a general summary of the primary justifications for—and problems with—a separate corporate tax, see SHAVIRO, supra note 22, at 3–42.
33. See id. at 13 (“By using the entity as a collection vehicle, one centralizes administration of the tax and needs only a single reporting taxpayer.”);
David A. Weisbach, New Equity Integration, 71 TAX L. REV. 1, 26–27 (2017)
(“By taxing the income at the shareholder level, a shareholder allocation system ensures that the income is taxed much the same as it would be if it were
earned outside of the corporation. Notwithstanding the accuracy it would provide, shareholder allocation systems are widely viewed as unadministrable in
the publicly-held corporation context and have never been seriously proposed.”).
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that follows reviews the basic rates and rules governing these
two systems before the 2017 legislation.
1. General Rules
Single Versus Double Taxation. Under “pass-through” taxation, the profits and losses of the business pass through to the
owners’ individual tax returns, with no separate entity-level
tax.34 In this system, the owners’ tax consequences depend
principally on when the business realizes taxable income and
how the business agreement allocates that income.35 The distribution of profits from the pass-through or the sale of ownership interests in the pass-through do not generally trigger additional tax, since the income would already have been taxed at
the individual level when earned.36
The corporate income tax system, in contrast, taxes certain
forms of business income twice: first at the entity level37 and
then at the individual level when the taxpayer receives distributions from the corporation or sells the corporate stock.38 The
double layer of tax applies only to income accruing to equity
shareholders. The corporation can deduct interest payments to

34. See I.R.C. §§ 61(a)(2), 63 (2017) (stating that income from a sole proprietorship is taxed as part of an individual’s gross income); id. § 701 (stating
that income from a tax partnership is similarly included on the partner’s individual income tax return); id. §§ 1361–1399 (stating that income from corporations that elect to be treated as S corporations similarly passes through to the
shareholder’s individual return).
35. For instance, a partner’s income from a partnership is based on the
partner’s distributive share of the partnerships gains and losses. See id.
§ 702(a)–(c).
36. See id. §§ 731(a) (governing distributions), 741 (governing gain upon
sale of a partnership interest). Distribution of money from the partnership can
trigger gain to the distributee, but only when the money distributed exceeds
the basis that the partner has in her partnership interest. Id. § 731(a). The
partner’s basis in the partnership interest is adjusted upward as the partnership recognizes income taxed at the partner level. Id. § 705. As a result, distributions of earnings generally do not result in additional taxable income to the
distribute, and the partner generally does not recognize further gain or loss
upon sale of a partnership interest unless there are underlying unrealized
gain or loss upon the sale of a partnership interest unless there are underlying
unrealized gains or losses on property in the partnership.
37. Id. § 11.
38. See id. § 61(a)(7) (taxation of dividends), § 61(a)(3) (taxation of capital
gains). Corporations cannot deduct these amounts, which results in the “double tax” on corporate income.
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debt-holders39 and employee compensation40 up to certain limits41 from its base of income subject to the entity-level tax. As a
result, these payments from a corporation are only taxed once
at the individual level.42
Relative Tax Rates. In the period immediately preceding
the 2017 tax legislation, the tax rules generally taxed income
earned through a pass-through more lightly than income
earned through a corporation. Before the 2017 tax legislation,
the Code taxed corporate income at a top average rate of 35%.43
If the corporation then immediately distributed the profits to
the shareholder (or if the shareholder sold their stock), the
shareholder would face an additional individual level tax of up
to 23.8%.44 The combined effective tax rate from these two layers of tax would have been approximately 50% for an owner facing the top rates.45 As described below, however, a taxpayer
may be able to reduce or eliminate the second individual layer
of tax on income earned through a corporation.46 In the extreme
case, only the first layer of tax—which reached 35% before
2017—would then apply.
In contrast, the Code only taxes income earned through the
pass-through at the individual level. Prior to the 2017 tax legis39. Id. § 163(a).
40. Id. § 162(a)(1).
41. The 2017 tax legislation capped the amount of deductible interest
payments at an amount equal to the sum of the corporation’s business interest
income, 30% of adjusted taxable income, and floor plan financing interest. The
2017 Tax Legislation, supra note 1, § 13301(a) (codified at I.R.C. § 163(j)
(2017)). The Code also limits the amount of deductible compensation paid to
certain corporate executives. I.R.C. § 162(m) (2017).
42. See id. § 61(a)(4) (taxation of interest), § 61(a)(1) (taxation of employee
compensation).
43. I.R.C. § 11(b) (2012). Prior law taxed corporate income under four general brackets, reaching 35%, plus two “bubble brackets” on income in certain
ranges, so that corporations with taxable income in excess of approximately
$18.33 million would pay an average rate of 35% on the entire taxable income
base. Id. Prior law also taxed income earned by a “personal service corporation” separately at an ungraduated 35% rate, irrespective of the amount
earned. Id. § 11(b)(2).
44. I.R.C. § 1(h)(1) (2012) set the maximum rate imposed on capital gains
at 20%. I.R.C. § 1411 (2012) added an additional 3.8% Medicare Contribution
tax for high income individuals, leading to a maximum tax rate of 23.8% on
capital gains.
45. 100% - (100% - 35%) x (100% - 23.8%) = 50.47%.
46. See discussion infra Part I.A.2.
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lation, the Code taxed ordinary income earned by an individual
through a pass-through at a top rate of approximately
43.4%47—a rate significantly lower than the combined effective
rate on corporate income subject to both layers of tax at the top
rates. In order for the two systems to produce roughly equivalent tax rates on ordinary income, a corporate shareholder
would have to avoid almost all of the individual layer of tax on
corporate income.
Entity Classification Rules. The “check the box” regulations
generally allow closely-held businesses to choose between the
corporate and pass-through systems.48 Eligible entities include
partnerships, LLCs, and certain other business forms organized under state law, as well as businesses not organized at
all under state law.49 Businesses organized as corporations under state law, which are ineligible for this election, can still
elect pass-through treatment as an “S corporation” if the entity
is not publicly traded and meets certain other requirements.50
Publicly-traded companies, however, are treated as taxable
corporations regardless of their status under state law,51 and
generally cannot elect S corporation treatment.52
The combination of a tax penalty on corporations relative
to pass-throughs and these choice-of-entity rules led many
closely-held companies to operate as pass-throughs before the

47. The maximum statutory tax rate at the time under the individual income tax was 39.6%. I.R.C. § 1(a)–(e) (2012). Additional taxes on different
forms of income increased the effective top rate by up to approximately 3.8%.
See, e.g., id. § 3101(b) (Medicare payroll tax and surtax), § 3111(b) (same),
§ 1401(b) (self-employment taxes), § 1411 (net investment income tax).
48. Eligible entities with two or more owners can elect to be classified either as a partnership (and be treated under subchapter K), or as an association (and be treated as a corporation for tax purposes). Treas. Reg.
§ 301.7701-3(a) (2019). Eligible entities with just a single owner can elect to be
classified as an association (and be treated as a corporation for tax purposes)
or “to be disregarded as an entity separate from its owner.” Id.
49. Id. § 301.7701-2(b) (2019).
50. I.R.C. § 1361(b) (2012).
51. Publicly-traded partnerships are generally treated as corporations
under I.R.C. § 7704 (2012). There are limited exceptions when a partnership
primarily engages in investing activities. Id. § 7704(c).
52. Corporations cannot elect S corporation treatment if, among other restrictions, they have more than 100 shareholders or have any shareholders
who are not individuals, which disqualifies most publicly-traded companies.
Id. § 1361(b)(1).
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2017 legislation, and largely reserved the corporate income tax
system for publicly-traded companies.53
2. Corporate Tax Reduction Opportunities and Anti-Abuse
Rules
Taxpayers may be able to use the corporate system to reduce their effective tax rate through a variety of strategies. Prior to the 2017 legislation, however, the relatively high corporate rate limited the potential benefit many taxpayers could
gain by earning income through a corporation and then using
these strategies, instead of earning the income through a passthrough.
The corporate system allows taxpayers to defer the second
individual layer of tax until they receive a distribution from the
corporation or dispose of their interest.54 Taxpayers can take
advantage of this deferral opportunity to reduce or eliminate
the second individual layer of tax.55 The taxpayer can defer the
individual layer of tax entirely, for example, by holding the
stock through their life and then benefitting from the “step-up”
in basis at death, which entirely eliminates the second layer of
53. See, e.g., George A. Plesko, “Gimme Shelter?” Closely Held Corporations Since Tax Reform, 48 NAT’L TAX J. 409, 415 (1995) (“Trends in the corporate sector, coupled with proposed policy changes at the federal level, suggest
a diminished role for the corporate tax among all but the largest companies.”);
George A. Plesko & Eric J. Toder, Changes in the Organization of Business Activity and Implications for Tax Reform, 66 NAT’L TAX J. 855, 868 (2013) (“In
contrast to the demographics of the business environment in 1986, far more
businesses (in both total and percentages) are organized as pass-through entities, and they account for a far larger percentage of economic activity.”); Bret
Wells, Pass-Through Entity Taxation: A Tempest in the Tax Reform Teapot, 14
HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 1, 17 (2014) (“[A]lthough Congress blocked the exit for
most publicly-traded companies through the adoption of Section 7704, it left in
place the means of side-stepping the corporate tax regime for non-publicly
traded companies by leaving the choice of entity decision with taxpayers, and
taxpayers have systematically chosen to conduct their business in passthrough entity structures in the post-1986 era.”).
54. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
55. Income earned through a pass-through, in contrast, flows through to
the owner’s individual income tax return in the year it is earned. Distributions
from the business do not, in general, trigger additional taxes because the income was fully taxed as it was earned. As a result, taxpayers generally do not
have a similar incentive to defer the receipt of income earned through a passthrough. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. But see Ari Glogower, Requiring Reasonable Comp From a Corp, 160 TAX NOTES 961 (2018) (describing
potential benefits from retaining earnings from an S corporation).
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tax.56 Similarly, a taxpayer could reduce or eliminate the second layer of tax by waiting until she is in a lower bracket before
taking a distribution or by taking advantage of other provisions
such as the exclusion of gains on the sale of certain small business stock.57 Finally, deferring the second layer of tax can reduce the effective tax liability if the corporation invests retained earnings in assets which would generate ordinary
income to an individual investor, such as taxable interestbearing bonds.58
In some circumstances, deferring the second layer of corporate tax does not reduce the effective liability. A taxpayer
would not benefit from deferring the distribution of corporate
earnings when the second individual layer of the corporate
double tax is ultimately paid and income from reinvested earnings is subject to approximately the same tax rate within the
corporation as it would be outside the corporation.59 This would
be the case for investments eligible for the long-term capital
gains rate.60 In other circumstances, however, retaining earnings within a corporation could allow the taxpayer to achieve
substantial tax savings.61
Before the 2017 tax legislation, however, the top individual
rate of approximately 43.4% did not significantly exceed the top
corporate rate of 35%.62 As a result, even if a taxpayer could entirely eliminate the second individual-layer of tax on corporate
earnings, the corporate system did not offer a significant tax
reduction opportunity relative to the pass-through system.63
56. I.R.C. § 1014 (2012); see, e.g., Edward J. McCaffery, A Voluntary Tax?
Revisited, 93 NAT’L TAX ASS’N PROC. 268, 271 (2000) (describing how a taxpayer can avoid the individual income tax through a “buy, borrow, die” strategy).
57. I.R.C. § 1202 (2012). For a more detailed description of these strategies, see Kamin et al., supra note 25, at 1449.
58. See Kamin et al., supra note 25, at 1451–52.
59. See Ari Glogower & David Kamin, Sheltering Income Through a Corporation, 164 TAX NOTES FED. 507, 515 (2019).
60. Id. at 508.
61. Id. (describing the potential benefits from earning income through a
corporation if the retained earnings generate ordinary income or if the taxpayer can reduce or eliminate the second individual layer of the corporate double
tax).
62. See supra notes 43, 47 and accompanying text.
63. The graduated corporate rates under prior law offered another potential advantage of using the corporate income tax system for a taxpayers who
would otherwise have had income taxed at the top individual income tax rate.
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These strategies offer greater benefits when the top individual
rate significantly exceeds the corporate rate, which was the
case in the years before the 1980s64 and, as described below, is
the case again after the changes in the 2017 tax legislation.65
To benefit from deferring the individual layer of tax on
corporate income, however, a taxpayer would also have to avoid
anti-abuse regimes for undistributed corporate earnings. Under
the personal holding company rules, a closely-held corporation
faces a 20% surtax on undistributed income from certain
sources.66 The rules apply to a company with five or fewer taxpayers holding a majority share and that earns “personal holding company income.”67 The accumulated earnings tax rules also impose a 20% surtax on any corporation’s retained earnings
beyond “the reasonable needs of the business.”68
The effect of these anti-abuse rules will vary considerably
based on taxpayers’ individual circumstances and their ability
to engage in sophisticated tax planning. A worker earning labor
income, for instance, cannot easily form a corporation, direct
her previous salary to that corporation, and retain her earnings
in that corporation to defer the second individual layer of tax.
This simple strategy would likely run afoul of both anti-abuse
rules.69 In other cases, more sophisticated taxpayers can skirt
In that case, a taxpayer could have benefitted from the lower marginal rates
on corporate income if the corporation did not fall into the highest bracket.
This opportunity was limited for service-oriented businesses by the flat 35%
rate on income from personal service corporations. See supra note 43.
64. Compare Historical Highest Marginal Income Tax Rates, URBANBROOKINGS TAX POL’Y CTR. (Jan. 18, 2019), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/
statistics/historical-highest-marginal-income-tax-rates [https://perma.cc/VS5D
-B9GD], with Corporate Top Tax Rate and Bracket, URBAN-BROOKINGS TAX
POL’Y CTR. (July 17, 2019) [hereinafter Corporate Rates, URBAN-BROOKINGS],
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/statistics/corporate-top-tax-rate-and-bracket
[https://perma.cc/D4MN-95BJ].
65. See infra Part I.B.
66. I.R.C. § 541 (2012).
67. Id. § 542(a). “Personal holding company income” includes income from
passive investments (such as dividends or royalties) as well as “personal service contracts,” which are service contracts designating a particular person to
provide the services. Id. § 543. At least 60% of the company’s adjusted gross
income must be from personal holding income in order for it be labeled as a
personal holding company. Id. § 542(a)(1).
68. Id. §§ 531–537.
69. The corporation would be a personal holding company subject to the
surtax on retained earnings since it would have only one owner and only in-

1516

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[104:1499

these rules with more complex operations. For instance, firms
can avoid the personal holding company rules by adding additional shareholders and the accumulated earnings tax by making business investments to justify retained earnings.70 For
these reasons, tax advisors and scholars have described the
rules as “notoriously ineffective”71 and easily avoidable by sophisticated taxpayers.72
MNCs could also use the corporate system to shift profits
to lower-tax foreign jurisdictions. A U.S. MNC could then avoid
any U.S. tax as long as it did not repatriate these profits from
foreign subsidiaries,73 while a foreign MNC would face no further U.S. liability if it shifts the profits out of its U.S. corporate
subsidiary to a foreign parent or another foreign subsidiary. A
series of rules sought to prevent these strategies by including
tests for determining if the U.S. corporation transacted with
the related foreign corporation as if it were an unrelated third
party,74 but many considered these rules insufficient, particu-

come attributable to a “personal service contract.” See supra notes 67–68. The
corporation might also be subject to the accumulated earnings tax, since it has
no business reason to retain the earnings. In this case only the personal holding company surtax would apply. See I.R.C. § 532(b)(1) (2012) (excepting personal holding companies from the accumulated earnings tax).
70. See I.R.C. § 542(a)(2) (2012) (stock ownership requirement allowing
more widely held corporations to avoid application of the personal holding
company tax); id. §§ 533(a), 533(c) (exemption from the accumulated earnings
tax for earnings retained for the “reasonable needs of the business”).
71. Michael L. Schler, Reflections on the Pending Tax Cuts and Jobs Act,
157 TAX NOTES 1731, 1733 (2017).
72. See Edward D. Kleinbard, Corporate Capital and Labor Stuffing in the
New Tax Rate Environment 50–56 (Univ. S. Cal., Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 13-5, Mar. 21, 2013), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2239360 (describing the limitations of these anti-abuse rules).
73. For a summary of the basic rules that taxed U.S. corporations on foreign income only when subsidiaries repatriated the funds (often called a “deferral” system), see DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, FIXING U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 54–57 (2014). As Shaviro notes, this regime was rooted in the longstanding doctrine that U.S. individuals and corporations are only taxed when
income is “realized” unless a statutory provision overrides this rule. Id. at 55.
74. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 482 (2012); Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b) (2019) (allowing
the IRS to reallocate income and deductions among related parties in order to
prevent tax evasion and to more accurately reflect the economic income of the
parties).
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larly for mobile and hard-to-value services and property such
as intellectual property.75
The pass-through system also offered unique tax reduction
opportunities prior to the 2017 tax legislation. The passthrough system gave taxpayers access to the preferential capital gains rate on sales of property, which does not apply to corporate income.76 Taxpayers could also use pass-throughs to
shift income through a variety of strategies.77 Prior to the introduction of Section 199A, however, the pass-through system’s
integration with the individual income tax system tended to
limit the scope of legal tax planning.78 Most critically, the passthrough system did not provide taxpayers the same opportunity
to defer or eliminate the individual tax by retaining earnings in
the firm.79

75. See, e.g., SHAVIRO, supra note 73, at 77 (describing the failure of
“transfer pricing” rules governing transactions between U.S. corporations and
related foreign parties); Richard L. Kaplan, International Tax Enforcement
and the Special Challenge of Transfer Pricing, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 299 (1990);
Edward D. Kleinbard, Stateless Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 699, 734–38 (2011)
(“Transfer pricing strategies are particularly effective because of the central
role of high-value unique intangible assets as profit drivers for multinational
firms.”). For further discussion of the magnitude of profit shifting under prior
law, see infra note 249 and accompanying text.
76. Compare I.R.C. § 1(h) (2012) (providing preferential tax rates for longterm capital gains for individuals), with id. § 11 (applying the corporate tax
rate to all taxable income of the corporation irrespective of whether it is a capital gain). For this reason, taxpayers had little incentive to earn qualifying
capital gains or dividends through a corporation.
77. For instance, members of a pass-through can try to allocate income or
loss to the partner in the best tax position to absorb it because of their applicable tax rate or other losses or deductions, even as the economics of the deal
might diverge from these tax allocations. See LAURA E. CUNNINGHAM & NOEL
B. CUNNINGHAM, THE LOGIC OF SUBCHAPTER K: A CONCEPTUAL GUIDE TO THE
TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS 58 (5th ed. 2017) (describing how partners might
try to specially allocate certain items of income or loss for purposes solely of
reducing income tax liabilities). There are rules to try to stop these maneuvers. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 704(b) (2012); Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(a)(2) (2019) (requiring that allocations have “substantial economic effect”). These strategies will
also generally only allow for the deferral—rather than the elimination—of
taxes, as the tax treatment of the partners will generally catch up with their
economic entitlements.
78. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
79. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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B. THE CHANGES IN THE 2017 TAX LEGISLATION
The 2017 law introduced significant preferences for business income earned through both corporations and passthroughs.80
The Corporate Rate Reduction. The 2017 tax legislation reduced the tax on corporate income to a flat 21% rate.81 This
dramatic reduction marked a new era for the corporate tax and
its role in the tax system. The change nearly halved the previous top rate of 35%82 and resulted in the lowest top rate on corporate income in nearly 80 years.83 At the time of passage, the
change was projected to reduce corporate tax revenues by more
than $1.3 trillion84 over the following decade and to accelerate
the trend of the declining share of federal tax revenues resulting from the corporate income tax.85
The 2017 legislation did not otherwise change the rules
governing access to the corporate system, however, nor the anti-abuse rules preventing taxpayers from avoiding the second
individual layer of tax by retaining corporate earnings. In fact,
the law removed a rate penalty that had applied to certain
kinds of service-oriented companies, which could not benefit

80. Of course, the 2017 tax legislation also changed many other tax rules
affecting taxpayers and businesses. This Article focuses on particular changes
to the taxation of both domestic and foreign income affecting taxpayers at the
top of the income distribution.
81. The 2017 Tax Legislation, supra note 1, § 13001 (codified at I.R.C § 11
(2017)).
82. I.R.C. § 11(b)(1) (2017). The progressive rate schedule and surtaxes for
income in certain brackets resulted in an average rate of 35% for corporations
with taxable income above $18.33 million. See supra note 43.
83. Corporate income over $25,000 was taxed a top rate of 19% in 1939,
before wartime revenue measures significantly increased rates beginning in
the 1940s. The top rate reached as high as about 53% in the late 1960’s before
falling to the mid-30% range in the late 1980s. Corporate Rates, URBANBROOKINGS, supra note 64.
84. J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 115th CONG., JCX-3-17, ESTIMATED BUDGET
EFFECTS OF THE CONFERENCE AGREEMENT FOR H.R. 1, THE “TAX CUTS AND
JOBS ACT,” at 3 (2017), https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=
startdown&id=5053 [https://perma.cc/8X4A-RG2R].
85. See J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 115th CONG., JCX-3-18, OVERVIEW OF THE
FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AS IN EFFECT FOR 2018, at 27 tbl.A-3, 30 fig.A-3 (2018),
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=5060
[https://perma.cc/GE7G-QZRD].
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from the previous graduated structure, thus making corporate
status more attractive for a broader range of taxpayers.86
Section 199A. The 2017 tax legislation also introduced the
new Section 199A, allowing a 20% deduction for certain forms
of business income earned through pass-throughs.87 The rules
determining eligibility for the new Section 199A deduction are
complex. Taxpayers with taxable income below a $157,500
threshold (doubled for joint filers) can generally claim the full
deduction against their qualifying income from a trade or business.88 For these purposes, qualifying income excludes certain
forms of investment income (such as capital gains and losses,
dividends and interests),89 compensation earned as an employee,90 and certain compensation-like payments made to an owner of an S corporation or a partnership.91 For taxpayers with
taxable income above the threshold, the amount of the deduction is further limited to either 50% of wages paid, or 25% of
wages and 2.5% of the cost of invested property.92 Finally, taxpayers in certain sectors of the economy with income above the
threshold are denied the deduction altogether. These
“[s]pecified services” include law, healthcare, finance, or “any
trade or business where the principal asset . . . is the reputation or skill of 1 or more of its employees.”93
The Section 199A deduction significantly reduced tax liabilities for affected businesses. For taxpayers in the top income
tax bracket of 37%, the deduction effectively reduced this top
rate by more than 7% to approximately 30% (before accounting
86. The 2017 Tax Legislation, supra note 1, § 13001 (codified at I.R.C. § 11
(2017)) (imposing a flat 21% rate on all corporations and eliminating the separate flat 35% rate applying to personal service corporations); see supra notes
43 and 63 (discussing the rules applying to personal service corporations).
87. The 2017 Tax Legislation, supra note 1, § 11001 (codified at I.R.C.
§ 199A (2017)). Section 199A is effective for eight years, from 2018 to 2025.
I.R.C. § 199A(i) (2017).
88. I.R.C. § 199A(d)(3)(B)(ii) (2017). The restrictions imposed above the
threshold phase-in over a $50,000 range above the threshold (doubled for married couples). Id.
89. Id. § 199A(c)(3)(B).
90. Id. § 199A(d)(1)(B). Technically, this restriction does not affect the definition of “qualified business income” but rather the definition of a “qualified
trade or business.” Id.
91. Id. § 199A(c)(4).
92. Id. § 199A(b)(2)(B).
93. Id. §§ 199A(d)(1), 1202(e)(3)(A).
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for other surtaxes).94 The Joint Committee on Taxation estimated that this unprecedented preference for pass-through
business income in the federal income tax would cost about $50
billion per year while it is in effect.95
Changes to the Treatment of Foreign Income. The 2017 legislation also specifically addressed the tax rates applying to
foreign income earned by both U.S. and foreign MNCs. First, in
certain circumstances, the reform shifted the United States
closer to a “territorial” tax system by no longer subjecting repatriated foreign earnings of U.S. MNCs to U.S. tax.96 To prevent MNCs from taking advantage of this change to avoid U.S.
taxes on income from mobile assets, the bill also included both
an incentive and a penalty to encourage taxpayers to report income from these assets in the U.S. The new “foreign derived intangible income” (FDII) rules provide a deduction for income
from domestic intangibles earned overseas,97 while the “global
intangible low-taxed income” (GILTI) taxes U.S. corporations
(at a reduced rate) on a portion of global income from intangibles located abroad, regardless of whether such income is repatriated.98 Finally, the bill introduced the Base Erosion and
Anti-Abuse Tax (BEAT), which penalized certain payments

94. 20% of the 37% rate equals 7.4%.
95. J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 85, at 1.
96. Specifically, the law introduced a “participation exemption” for dividends received by a U.S. parent company from foreign subsidiaries. The 2017
Tax Legislation, supra note 1, § 14101 (codified at I.R.C. § 245A (2017)). In
transition, it also imposed a one-time deemed repatriation tax on deferred foreign income. Id. § 14103 (codified at I.R.C. § 965 (2017)). A “territorial” tax
system is one in which a country taxes only the profits of corporations
“sourced” to that country. A “worldwide” system by contrast taxes the worldwide profits of corporations resident in the country. SHAVIRO, supra note 73, at
1. The pre-2017 system was hybrid of both, as it taxed profits of U.S. corporations on a worldwide basis but often only taxed foreign profits only when repatriated. The post-2017 system is also a hybrid, but it has a different package
of rules, since it still taxes some foreign profits of U.S. MNCs (with no deferral
option) through the new minimum tax discussed infra note 98. See Susan C.
Morse, International Cooperation and the 2017 Act, 128 YALE L.J.F. 362, 368
(2018) (describing how the system continues to be a hybrid of worldwide and
territorial taxation).
97. The 2017 Tax Legislation, supra note 1, § 14102 (codified at I.R.C.
§ 250 (2017)).
98. Id. § 14101 (codified at I.R.C. § 951A (2017)).
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from companies to related foreign parties99 with the aim of reducing profit shifting by both U.S. and foreign-based MNCs.
Other Changes to Top Rates. In contrast to the transformative changes to the taxation of corporations and pass-through
business income, the 2017 tax legislation did not significantly
change other top tax rates. The legislation slightly reduced the
top marginal rate on ordinary income from 39.6% to 37%.100
Rates in this range have been the general norm for the past
quarter century.101 The 2017 tax legislation also preserved the
prior top rates of tax on long-term capital gains and qualified
dividends, which remained at 23.8%.102
Relative Tax Rates. As a result of the changes in the 2017
tax legislation (and including surtaxes), ordinary individual income is taxed at a top rate of 40.8%103 while qualifying passthrough income is taxed at a top rate of 33.4%.104 Corporate income is subject to top rates ranging from 21%—if a taxpayer
can avoid the individual layer of tax on this income—to
39.8%105 if the corporate income is immediately distributed and
subject to the second individual layer of tax.
C. ASSESSMENTS IN THE LITERATURE
These changes in the 2017 tax legislation received conflicting receptions among many commentators. The design of Section 199A garnered widespread critique, including from some
supporters of the bill’s other changes.106 The corporate rate reduction, in contrast, received tacit acceptance or even approbation from many corners as necessary to address global pressures from lower taxes on mobile income in foreign

99. Id. § 14401 (codified at I.R.C. § 59A (2017)).
100. Compare id. § 11001(a) (codified at I.R.C. § 1(j)(2017)) (setting a 37%
top rate from 2018 to 2025), with I.R.C. § 1(a) (2017) (setting a 39.6% top rate
for other years).
101. Historical Highest Marginal Income Tax Rates, supra note 64.
102. The top 20% rate under I.R.C. § 1(h)(1)(D) (2017) plus the 3.8% Net
Investment Income Tax under § 1411 (2017).
103. See I.R.C. § 1(j)(2) (2017) (setting a 37% top marginal rate). Additional
taxes on different forms of income can increase the effective top rate by up to
approximately 3.8% to around 40.8%. See supra note 47.
104. 37% x (100% - 20%) + 3.8% = 33.4%.
105. 21% + 23.8% x (100% - 21%) = 39.80%.
106. See infra notes 110–15 and accompanying text.
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jurisdictions.107 A separate literature, to which we were early
contributors, focused on the new planning opportunities to minimize taxes across the two systems.108 Many commentators also
criticized the legislation’s explicit revenue and distributional
costs.109 At the same time, the emerging conversation advocating for raising rates on the highest earners has largely not accounted for the structural consequences of the 2017 tax legislation and how they may obstruct these efforts.
This Section summarizes these common assessments of the
2017 tax legislation in the literature to date. Part III then revisits these assessments in light of the progressivity ratchet
and describes how both the corporate rate cut and Section 199A
reflect the same mistakes in misapplying the neutrality principle and pose a similar structural obstacle to future progressive
reforms.
1. A Tale of Two Business Preferences
The Design of Section 199A. Section 199A garnered the
most sustained criticism from commentators. For instance, Professor Daniel Shaviro—a leading critic of the provision—
acknowledges that Section 199A might have prevented some
taxpayers from shifting to the corporate system, but nonetheless concludes that “[t]he pass-through rules stand front and
centre in illustrating both the 2017 Act’s sloppiness and its lack
of principle.”110 Shaviro argues that the provision “direct[s]
economic activity away from some market sectors and towards
others, for no good reason and scarcely even an articulated bad
one.”111 In a prior work, a group of law professors and practitioners—including ourselves—also described the many “games”
that taxpayers could play to take advantage of the arbitrary
distinctions underlying the provision, by restructuring their
transactions and activities in order to access the preferential
rates.112
Even many commentators who favored other aspects of the
legislation—and preferences for business income in general—
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

See infra notes 122–38 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 145–53 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 154–64 and accompanying text.
See Shaviro, supra note 25, at 51.
Id.
See Kamin et al., supra note 25, at 1462–73.
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still criticized the design of Section 199A. For instance, the Tax
Foundation, a leading proponent of the corporate rate cut and
the legislation overall, wrote that “[t]he design of the passthrough deduction leaves room for improvement” and listed a
variety of flaws with the provision.113 Economists at the International Monetary Fund (IMF), who praised the corporate rate
reduction, more bluntly concluded that “[i]t would be better not
to have the 20 percent deduction for certain types of passthrough income.”114 Others similarly criticized Section 199A
but did not criticize the large reduction in the corporate rate.115
Some commentators defended Section 199A, but they were
few and far between, especially among scholars and analysts.
For example, in testimony before the Senate Finance Committee giving an early assessment of the recently enacted legislation, former Congressional Budget Office director Douglas
Holtz-Eakin, argued that “it was an absolutely necessary part
of the tax reform. You want to have a level tax playing field between the different kinds of entities. . . .”116 Not surprisingly,
policymakers responsible for the provision and industry groups
who benefitted from it also continued to defend the rule.117
113. GREENBERG & KAEDING, supra note 23, at 1.
114. Chalk et al., supra note 22, at 19.
115. See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, supra note 23, at 4–5 (describing the corporate
rate cut as “long overdue” while criticizing the pass-through deduction as “one
big problem” with the tax bill). As noted supra note 23, other commentators
may not have embraced the corporate rate cut, but they also have not highlighted the case for its reversal, as they propose for other changes in the 2017
legislation. For instance, Jared Bernstein lists a set of tax increases progressives should consider in addition to Representative Ocasio-Cortez’s 70% top
rate and includes repeal of the pass-through deduction but not an increase in
the corporate rate. See Bernstein, supra note 23.
116. Early Impressions of the New Tax Law, Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on Fin., 115th Cong. (2018) [hereinafter Holtz-Eakin Testimony] (statement of
Douglas Holtz-Eakin, President, American Action Forum), https://www
.finance.senate.gov/hearings/early-impressions-of-the-new-tax-law [https://
perma.cc/BBF4-24RF].
117. See, e.g., Early Impressions of the New Tax Law, Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Fin., 115th Cong. 4 (2018) (written statement of Sen. Hatch,
Chairman, S. Comm. on Fin.) (Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.finance.senate
.gov/imo/media/doc/4.24%20Hatch%20Opening%20Statement%20at%
20Finance%20Hearing%20on%20Progress%20of%20New%20Tax%20Law.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P4E7-ZGYM] (“[W]hy would we not want to get more money
back to these business owners so that they can grow their businesses, hire
more employees, and improve our economy?”); Breaking Down the Small Business Pass-Through Deduction: Who Benefits and How?, NAT’L FED’N INDEP.
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Some policymakers—though few academics or policy analysts—also justified Section 199A as maintaining neutrality between income earned in the corporate and pass-through systems.118 For example, Senator Ron Johnson (R-WI), a leading
advocate for a pass-through tax cut, argued that “it is important to maintain the domestic competitive position and balance between large publicly-traded C corporations and ‘passthrough entities’ (subchapter S corporations, partnerships and
sole proprietorships).”119 Similarly, Senator Rob Portman (ROH), defending the pass-through tax cut on the Senate floor,
argued that the provision was “try[ing] to have some more parity between the pass-through companies and the so-called C
corporations.”120
Echoing similar themes, a representative for the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants submitted testimony
to the Senate Finance Committee supporting a pass-through
tax cut: “If Congress, through tax reform, lowers the income tax
rates for C corporations, all types of business entities should
receive a rate reduction . . . . Tax reform should not disadvantage [pass-through] entities or require businesses to engage
in complex entity changes to obtain favored tax status.”121
BUS. (Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.nfib.com/content/analysis/alabama/
breaking-down-section-small-business-pass-through-deduction-who-benefits
-and-how/ [https://perma.cc/4N5Z-KA3T] (“The Small Business Pass-Through
Deduction of section 199A is one of the biggest triumphs following the 2017
passage of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act.”).
118. This general concern with neutrality between the pass-through and
corporate systems also predated the 2017 tax legislation. For instance, the
Obama administration’s tax reform efforts suggested a similar goal of neutrality in the average tax rates between the systems. See THE WHITE HOUSE &
THE DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, THE PRESIDENT’S FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESS
TAX REFORM 7 (2012) [hereinafter 2012 JOINT REPORT], https://www
.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/tax-analysis/Documents/OTA-Report
-Business-Tax-Reform-2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/QN4L-KURN] (“The effective
marginal tax rate on new investment by C-corporations is now 32.3 percent,
while the effective marginal tax rate on new investment by pass-through businesses 26.4 percent . . . . The ability of large pass-through entities to take advantage of preferential tax treatment has placed businesses organizing as
C-corporations at a disadvantage.”).
119. Senator Johnson made this statement in opposition to the legislation
at the time while seeking an even larger preference for pass-through businesses. See Sen. Johnson Press Release, supra note 23.
120. 163 CONG. REC. S7674 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 2017) (statement of Sen.
Portman).
121. See Business Tax Reform: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 115th
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The Corporate Rate Reduction. Unlike Section 199A, the
corporate rate reduction earned tacit acceptance or praise from
many quarters.122 Advocates for cutting the corporate tax rate
often focused on the pressures from lower tax rates in foreign
jurisdictions.123 In their 2016 proposed tax reform framework
“A Better Way,” House Republicans called for a 20% corporate
rate, so that “[i]nstead of having some of the highest tax rates
on entrepreneurship and business activity in the world, the
United States will leapfrog many of its trading partners and offer globally competitive rates.”124 The Obama administration
had also similarly proposed cutting the corporate rate—if not
as dramatically—to 28%, in order to reduce the disparity between U.S. and foreign rates.125
Two primary concerns motivated these proposals to reduce
the U.S. corporate rate.126 The first concern was profit shifting.127 MNCs had an incentive to report profits in lower-tax forCong. 70 (2018) (written statement of Troy K. Lewis, CPA, GGMA, Immediate
Past Chair, Tax Executive Committee, American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants).
122. See, e.g., Graetz, supra note 23, at 315 (“By lowering the corporate tax
rate from 35% to 21%, [the 2017 tax legislation] brings the U.S. statutory rate
into closer alignment with the rates applicable in other Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) nations, thereby decreasing the
incentive for businesses to locate their deductions in the United States and
their income abroad.”).
123. See, e.g., GOP, A BETTER WAY, supra note 22, app. at 32 (“A high corporate tax rate discourages foreign businesses from locating and investing in
the United States and puts U.S. firms at a competitive disadvantage with the
rest of the world.”).
124. Id. at 23.
125. THE WHITE HOUSE & THE DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, THE PRESIDENT’S
FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESS TAX REFORM: AN UPDATE 5 (2016) [hereinafter
2016 JOINT REPORT], https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/
Documents/The-Presidents-Framework-for-Business-Tax-Reform-An-Update
-04-04-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/QYB6-QLRD] (“Income shifting has also
grown worse as the wedge between the U.S. statutory rate and rates in other
countries has widened, and the absence of reform has left strategies used to
shift income untouched.”). Unlike the changes in the 2017 legislation however,
the Obama Administration proposal was designed to be revenue-neutral and
preserve the same amount of revenue raised from corporations by offsetting
the rate reduction with base-broadening measures. Id. at 17–19.
126. See, e.g., SHAVIRO, supra note 22 (describing competition for reported
profits and actual investment as the two justifications that advocates offer for
lowering the corporate tax rate).
127. Id.; see also Business Tax Reform, supra note 121, at 2 (statement of
Sen. Orrin Hatch, Chairman, S. Comm. on Fin.) (“The current system gives
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eign countries, even if their actual economic activity occurred in
the United States.128 Evidence suggested that profit shifting
was a significant and growing problem in the years leading up
to the 2017 legislation.129
For example, IMF economists offered the following assessment of the corporate rate cut:
The [2017 legislation] . . . mov[es] the U.S. from having been . . . an
increasingly isolated outlier relative to other advanced and emerging
economies to now being close to the median of tax rate imposed by
other OECD countries . . . . Most observers regard a cut in the statutory rate of corporation tax as long overdue. Many of the most significant distortions implicit in the U.S. system—including incentives to
shift profits outside the US (including by inverting)130 and toward artificially high leverage—are ameliorated simply by reducing the statutory tax rate . . . .131

The IMF economists’ assessment suggests that there is importance to lowering the U.S. corporate rate to be more neutral
relative to the rates in other countries.132 They note that some
corporate income, if taxed at the full U.S. corporate rate, may
shift to lower tax substitutes, such as profits that can be shifted
abroad to lower tax jurisdictions.133 The corporate rate cut thus
helps address that distortion and improve neutrality along this
corporations incentives to shift income production and intangible assets, like
intellectual property, from the U.S. to lower-taxed foreign jurisdictions, thereby eroding our tax base.”); 2016 JOINT REPORT, supra note 125, at 4–5 (stating
the U.S. tax system’s complexity and loopholes “allow[ ] large corporations to
reduce their tax liability by shifting profits around the globe”).
128. See 2016 JOINT REPORT, supra note 125, at 5.
129. See, e.g., Kimberly A. Clausing, The Effect of Profit Shifting on the
Corporate Tax Base in the United States and Beyond, 69 NAT’L TAX J. 905,
918–19 (2016) (estimating that revenue loss from profit shifting was growing
and, by 2012, equaled about 30% to 45% of actual corporate receipts); Thomas
R. Tørsløv et al., The Missing Profits of Nations tbl.2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 24701, 2018) (estimating that, as of 2015, revenue loss from profit shifting equaled 14% of actual receipts).
130. In an inversion transaction, a parent corporation changes its residence
from the United States to a foreign country, typically in order to reduce profits
subject to tax in the United States. See also Chalk et al., supra note 22, at 5
n.5 (“Corporate inversion is the process whereby a U.S. based company changes its legal domicile to an offshore jurisdiction, usually by merging with a foreign corporation.”).
131. Id. at 4–5. The IMF also cited other distortions created by the corporate income tax—such as the type of economic activity—that would be reduced
by the cut in the corporate rate. Id. at 5.
132. See id. at 4.
133. Id. at 5.
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margin.134 Other commentators expressed this same assessment, including some who specifically criticized Section
199A.135
Other commentators also argued that the higher U.S. rates
discouraged the location of real economic investment in the
United States.136 Under this view, a corporate rate cut could also increase actual economic activity by encouraging corporations to invest in the United States.137 For instance, Alan Auerbach suggested that a corporate rate reduction could also yield
a modest increase in real investment.138
Some commentators did criticize the corporate rate cut.139
Some suggested that the benefits did not justify the significant
domestic revenue loss140 or had undesirable distributional effects.141 However, most of this critical commentary focused on
134. Id.
135. See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, supra note 23, at 4 (“On the corporate side, the
main change is a long overdue reduction of the rate to 21% . . . .”); Graetz, supra note 23, at 315–16, 320 (describing the corporate rate cut as justified given
the competitive global environment for location of profits while concluding
that the pass-through deduction is “unprecedented” and “troublesome”).
136. See, e.g., Business Tax Reform, supra note 121, at 2 (statement of Sen.
Orrin Hatch, Chairman, S. Comm. on Fin.) (“Our current business tax system—and the disparity between the U.S. corporate rate and our foreign competitors’ corporate rates—has created a number of problems and distortions.
For example, the current system slows economic growth by impeding capital
formation . . . .”); GOP, A BETTER WAY, supra note 22, at 9 (“The corporate tax
rate represents the most important tax-related factor in a company’s decision
to invest and locate jobs in the United States or overseas.”).
137. See Business Tax Reform, supra note 121, at 2 (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch, Chairman, S. Comm. on Fin.).
138. See Alan J. Auerbach, Measuring the Effects of Corporate Tax Cuts, 32
J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES. 97, 115–17 (2018).
139. See, e.g., MARR ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET AND POL’Y PRIORITIES, NEW
TAX LAW IS FUNDAMENTALLY FLAWED AND WILL REQUIRE BASIC RESTRUCTURING (2018), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/4-9-18tax
.pdf [https://perma.cc/V92L-3JAL].
140. See, e.g., id. at 2 (“These large revenue losses are irresponsible given
the fiscal challenges the nation will face over the next several decades due to
an aging population, health care costs that likely will continue to rise faster
than the economy, interest rates returning to more normal levels, potential
national security threats, and current and emerging domestic challenges such
as large infrastructure needs that cannot be deferred indefinitely.”).
141. E.g., id. at 3 (“The new tax law will increase income inequality since it
delivers far larger tax cuts to households at the top, measured as a share of
income, than to households at the bottom or middle of the income distribution.”).
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the immediate and explicit costs of the rate reduction.142 Other
commentators also warned of the broader threat to progressive
taxation from a corporate rate cut, both in the context of the
2017 legislation and under prior law.143 This Article builds on
that literature, by first explaining how the corporate rate cut
was poorly targeted to activity that did not warrant perferences, and then describing why this mistargeting could interact
with political economy constraints to limit the progressive potential of future tax reform.
2. Tax Planning Across Systems
Other commentators described how the 2017 legislation allowed taxpayers to plan across both the corporate and passthrough systems in order to minimize their tax liabilities.144 We
contributed to this literature with our report on the legislation
titled The Games They Will Play.145
In our Games report, we described how both the corporate
and pass-through preferences allow taxpayers to avoid taxation
at the top individual rate.146 The choice between the tax reduction opportunities under each system will depend on the cir142. See, e.g., id. at 5–6.
143. For instance, Professor Daniel Shaviro cautioned that a low corporate
rate could result in leakage from the individual income tax system. See
SHAVIRO, supra note 22, at xii–xiii. Similarly, Professor Edward Kleinbard described the potential importance of taxpayers “stuffing” income into corporations and avoiding the individual income tax as corporate rates fall. See generally Kleinbard, supra note 72. Eric Toder also described the challenges created
by a corporate rate cut for individual income tax. See Eric Toder, Filling the
Gap: Pass-Through Businesses and Tax Reform, MILKEN INST. REV., Jan.–
Mar. 2018, at 37, https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/default/files/
publication/138506/2001156-filling-the-gap-pass-through-businesses-and-tax
-reform.pdf [https://perma.cc/RZJ5-NXLC]; Eric Toder, Eliminate the Deduction for Qualified Business Income and Require Most Firms To Be Taxed as
Pass-Throughs, TAXVOX: BUS. TAXES (June 4, 2018) [hereinafter Toder, Require Firms To Be Taxed As Pass-Throughs], https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/
taxvox/eliminate-deduction-qualified-business-income-and-require-most-firms
-be-taxed-pass-throughs [https://perma.cc/45TF-6RRQ]. Finally, the Center on
Budget and Policy Priorities has produced a more comprehensive critique of
the corporate rate cut in the 2017 legislation, describing how the cut would
disproportionately benefit the top of the income distribution and encourage tax
sheltering. See MARR ET AL., supra note 139, at 5, 17.
144. See, e.g., Kamin et al., supra note 25, at 1450–54, 1462–72.
145. See generally id. (analyzing the tax games “well-advised taxpayers”
will play to avoid paying taxes).
146. Id. at 1445–73.
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cumstances of the individual taxpayers.147 In a subsequent article, we then described how these games result in part from
the economic incoherence of the categories of activities that receive preferential treatment in both the corporate and passthrough systems.148
Other commentators have subsequently expanded on these
ideas to highlight the significance of the different tax reduction
opportunities under the two systems.149 Professor James Repetti described how, because of the different underlying rules and
tax reduction opportunities, the 2017 legislation did not achieve
neutrality between the corporate and pass-through systems.
Rather, one system or the other will be tax-advantaged for particular taxpayers, depending on their circumstances.150 Repetti
concluded that “the 2017 Tax Act has made tax planning more
important in selecting an entity to conduct a business, not
less.”151
Similarly, Professor Bradley Borden emphasized the context-specific nature of the choice of entity decision in the wake
of the 2017 law: “Now, business structuring decisions demand a
more comprehensive analysis due to the highly situational nature of organizational form preferences.”152 Borden argued further that, “[i]n fact, the preferred organizational form following
the [2017 legislation] may be a combination of various entities.”153 The possibility that taxpayers may now prefer a combination of entities evidences the degree to which the 2017 legis-

147. Id.
148. See generally Ari Glogower & David Kamin, Missing the Mark: Evaluating the New Tax Preferences for Business Income, 71 NAT’L TAX J. 789, 790
(2018) (explaining how the 2017 Tax Legislation’s “incoherent approach to defining business income . . . results in business preferences to all types of economic returns . . . if these returns are earned in certain forms and in certain
sectors of the economy”).
149. See, e.g., James R. Repetti, The Impact of the 2017 Act’s Tax Rate
Changes on Choice of Entity, 21 FLA. TAX REV. 686 (2018).
150. See id. at 714 (“[T]he 2017 Tax Act has made it more difficult to predict which choice of entity will have the lowest effective tax rate in the long
run.”).
151. Id. at 688.
152. Bradley T. Borden, Income-Based Effective Tax Rates and Choice-ofEntity Considerations Under the 2017 Tax Act, 71 NAT’L TAX J. 613, 615
(2018).
153. Id.

1530

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[104:1499

lation failed to achieve neutrality across the systems, and in
fact may have widened the cleavage for many taxpayers.
The discussion that follows builds upon these insights in
the Games reports and the works of Repetti and Borden. Parts
II and III describe conceptually when the introduction of preferences increase opportunities for tax planning and when they
do not—and the consequences of these effects for progressive
taxation in the presence of political economy constraints. Part
IV then returns to the corporate rate cut and pass-through deductions, and explains how they are examples of poorly targeted preferences that, if retained, are likely to constrain the progressive potential from future tax reforms.
3. Revenue and Distributional Effects
Finally, many commentators criticized the explicit revenue
costs and regressive distributional effects of the 2017 legislation as a whole.154 The CBO projected that the legislation would
cost nearly $2 trillion in the period from 2018–2028, after accounting for additional interest expenses and macroeconomic
effects.155 The legislation’s large net cost has been a focal point
of criticism, even among commentators who generally supported particular changes such as the corporate rate reduction.156
Commentators also criticized the explicit regressive effects
of the changes in the 2017 legislation, which generally provided
the largest benefits to the wealthiest taxpayers.157 The UrbanBrookings Tax Policy Center (TPC) estimated that the lowest
80% of earners would receive an average tax cut of around 1.5%
of after-tax income in 2018,158 while the top 1% would receive

154. See, e.g., MARR ET AL., supra note 139.
155. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: 2018
TO 2028, at 106 (2018), https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2019-04/53651
-outlook-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/L4UD-WUSP] (estimating an updated net cost
from the legislation of approximately $1.9 trillion including interest expense
and macroeconomic feedback).
156. See, e.g., Graetz, supra note 23, at 323–24 (criticizing the effect on the
deficit while generally supporting the corporate rate reduction).
157. See, e.g., MARR ET AL., supra note 139, at 4 (“The new tax law
will . . . add to the growing polarization of income and wealth of recent decades.”).
158. Authors’ calculations based on URBAN-BROOKINGS TAX POLICY CTR.,
TABLE T18-0025, THE TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT (TCJA): ALL PROVISIONS AND
INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX PROVISIONS (2018), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/
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an average cut of around 3.4% of after-tax income.159 Section
199A alone gives a tax cut over 20 times larger (as a share of
after-tax income) for the top 1% than for the bottom 80%.160
The distributional effect of the corporate tax cut is a matter of
greater dispute, because this calculation depends on estimates
of the share of corporate taxes borne, respectively, by investors,
managers, and workers. A consensus view holds, however, that
corporate rate cuts disproportionately benefit the corporate investors, who tend to be heavily concentrated at the top of the
income distribution.161
Some commentators also described additional implicit effects from the 2017 legislation’s changes that do not factor into
the estimates of its explicit revenue and distributional effects.162 In the future, tax increases, spending reductions, or a
combination of both will likely finance these deficit-increasing
tax cuts.163 William Gale and researchers at the TPC show how,
under a range of financing assumptions, taxpayers toward the
model-estimates/individual-income-tax-provisions-tax-cuts-and-jobs-act-tcja
-february-2018/t18-0025 [https://perma.cc/LT3L-DPP3].
159. Id.
160. Authors’ calculations based on URBAN-BROOKINGS TAX POLICY CTR.,
TABLE T18-0123, TAX BENEFIT OF THE 20 PERCENT DEDUCTION FOR QUALIFIED
PASS-THROUGH BUSINESS INCOME, (2018), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/
model-estimates/individual-income-tax-expenditures-october-2018/t18-0213
-tax-benefit-20-percent [https://perma.cc/3TBL-C98C].
161. See CHYE-CHING HUANG & BRANDON DEBOT, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, CORPORATE TAX CUTS SKEW TO SHAREHOLDERS AND CEOS,
NOT WORKERS AS ADMINISTRATION CLAIMS 4 tbl.1 (2017), https://www
.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/7-20-17tax.pdf [https://perma.cc/RB4K
-9TZS] (showing the allocation of the corporate tax burden by a variety of estimators); JAMES R. NUNNS, URBAN-BROOKINGS TAX POLICY CTR., HOW TPC
DISTRIBUTES THE CORPORATE INCOME TAX 18 tbl.8 (2012), https://www
.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/how-tpc-distributes-corporate-income-tax
[https://perma.cc/E83K-EHFM] (evaluating the evidence on the burden of the
corporate income tax and concluding that rate reductions, as opposed to more
direct incentives for investment, are particularly regressive with over 50% of
the benefit going to the top 1%); see also Joel Slemrod, Is This Tax Reform, or
Just Confusion?, 32 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 73, 90 (2018) (“[T]o assert that
[corporate tax reductions] will largely benefit workers is, in my opinion, a
stretch that the empirical literature does not substantiate.”).
162. See, e.g., WILLIAM GALE ET AL., URBAN-BROOKINGS TAX POLICY CTR.,
WINNERS AND LOSERS AFTER PAYING FOR THE TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT 1–2
(Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/winners-and
-losers-after-paying-tax-cuts-and-jobs-act/full [https://perma.cc/8J67-R2AG].
163. Id. at 1.
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middle and the bottom will likely bear a disproportionate burden of the legislation’s costs once these future deficit reduction
measures are taken into account, while taxpayers at the top of
the distribution will likely enjoy a significant net benefit.164
The discussion in Part IV returns to a variation of this
question of future financing and explains how the 2017 legislation’s structure will obstruct future efforts to finance its costs
and generate additional revenue through future progressive
taxes, thereby highlighting additional dimensions of Gale’s
finding. Before returning to the discussion of the 2017 tax legislation and its structural obstacles to progressive reforms, however, Part II and III first describe the theory of the progressivity ratchet in abstract terms.
II. NEUTRALITY AND TAX PREFERENCES
This Part describes well-known principles of efficient tax
design in the public finance literature. It then builds upon
these principles to discuss the case of tax preferences introduced in response to other preexisting preferences in the tax
law. This discussion explains—by revisiting the neutrality
principle—how a new tax preference introduced in response to
an initial preference can either increase or decrease efficiency
in the tax system, and emphasizes the first-order significance
of the particular legal rules governing access to the preferences
in determining the effect of a new preference (such as the corporate rate reduction or Section 199A). The discussion in this
Part describes the harm, within an optimal tax framework, of
introducing poorly targeted preferences. Part III then builds
from this analysis to describe the how these effects can interact
with political constraints to result in less progressive outcomes.
A. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
This Section first describes why, as a general matter, the
tax system should treat close substitutes similarly in order to
minimize costly tax avoidance. The following Sections then illustrate the challenges in applying this basic principle in the
case of real-world tax rules that define the taxable base in different ways and that offer unique tax reduction opportunities.
164. Id. at 9–11, 15–16, 18–29 tbls. 1–12 (describing how the distributional
effects of the House and Senate bills change under different possible financing
scenarios).
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The public finance literature offers a basic principle for tax
design: raising taxes will generate greater tax avoidance—
resulting in revenue loss and efficiency costs—to the degree
taxpayers can escape tax increases by changing the form or
substance of their activities.165 This broad statement can be
understood through three factors described below: (1) the
amount of the change in a specific tax base resulting from a
change in tax rates on that base, often referred to as the elasticity of the tax base; (2) the amount of revenue lost per unit of
decline in the amount of the tax base as rates rise, which this
Article refers to as the “tax rate differential”; and (3) the efficiency cost of raising additional taxes through a particular tax
rule, often referred to in the literature as the “marginal efficiency cost of taxation.”166 In turn, these three concepts lead to
the “neutrality principle” which provides that close substitutes
for the same activities should be taxed more similarly than
should activities which are not close substitutes.
Elasticity of the Tax Base. The elasticity of the tax base refers to the amount that the tax base changes resulting from a
change in the tax rates on that base, as taxpayers respond to a
rate change by changing the form or substance of their taxable
activities.167 In the case of the income tax, this measure is often
called the “elasticity of taxable income.”168
Elasticity of the tax base depends upon both “margins” in
the tax law and “substitutes” for the taxable activity. A margin
in the tax law distinguishes between different taxable activities, and potentially treats one activity less favorably than the
other.169 The term “substitute” in this context refers to an alternative to a taxable activity that a taxpayer may favor if the

165. See, e.g., Emmanuel Saez et al., The Elasticity of Taxable Income with
Respect to Marginal Tax Rates: A Critical Review, 50 J. ECON. LIT. 3, 4 (2012)
(“Taxes trigger a host of behavioral responses intended to minimize the burden on the individual. In the absence of externalities or other market failure,
and putting aside income effects, all such responses are sources of inefficiency . . . .”).
166. See infra note 180 and accompanying text.
167. See Saez et al., supra note 165, at 4.
168. See id. at 4 (describing elasticity of taxable income as a “worthy topic
of investigation” for its ability to capture behavioral responses to taxation).
169. David Weisbach has referred to “margins” in the tax system as “lines”
and the challenge of defining those margins or lines as the “line-drawing problem.” See Weisbach, supra note 11, at 71.
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cost of the taxable activity increases.170 The elasticity of a tax
base in turn measures the responsiveness of a taxpayer to
higher taxes on one taxable activity, as they shift across a margin in the tax law to substitute into another activity not subject
to the same tax increase.171
The elasticity of a given base therefore depends on the
availability of substitutes that are treated more favorably and
the sensitivity of taxpayers to changes in the relative costs of
different activities. If a close substitute exists for a taxable activity, then that taxable activity will have a higher elasticity. If
the taxable activity does not have a close substitute, then its
elasticity will be lower.
To illustrate, consider the simple example of an economy
with only two activities—Activity A and Activity B—and an income tax system that taxes the income from each. Assume that
Activity A and Activity B both yield $10 million of income.
Lawmakers then introduce a margin in the tax law that treats
the two activities differently and raise the tax rate on Activity
A—but not on Activity B (which is now preferentially taxed)—
by 1%. The efficiency costs and revenue effects of this rate increase will depend, in part, on the degree to which Activity B is
a close substitute for Activity A. If the tax increase on Activity A
will induce taxpayers to substitute Activity B for Activity A to
receive more favorable tax treatment—that is, if Activity A is
relatively elastic—then the tax increase on Activity A will generate greater efficiency costs and raise less revenue.
For example, assume $500,000 of income from Activity A
may shift to Activity B because of the 1% tax rate increase on
Activity A. Calculating the resulting revenue loss and efficiency
cost from that substitution then requires one additional piece of
information: the magnitude of the tax rate differential between
the two activities.
The Tax Rate Differential. The tax rate differential
measures the magnitude of the difference in tax rates applied
to two taxable activities.172 That is, the tax rate differential
170. See, e.g., id. at 77 (“Suppose cars are taxed but other methods of
transportation are not. People will switch to close substitutes for cars, say,
small trucks.”); see also ROSEN & GAYER, supra note 10 and accompanying
text.
171. See, e.g., Saez et al., supra note 165, at 6 (defining elasticity of taxable
income).
172. Saez et al. describe the role of this tax rate differential in analyzing
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may be understood as measuring the magnitude of the margin
separating the two activities. Returning to the example above,
assume that, prior to the 1% tax increase on Activity A, the
rules taxed Activity A at a 30% rate and Activity B at a 20%
rate. This system therefore raised $5 million in total revenues:
$3 million from taxing income from Activity A173 and $2 million
from taxing the income from Activity B.174
Policymakers can then calculate the additional revenue
generated by the 1% increase in the tax rate on income from
Activity A through two steps. The first step considers the revenue effect on a purely static basis, assuming no substitution to
Activity B. In the example above, the static effect of the 1% increase would yield an additional $100,000 of revenue.175 The
second step calculates the revenue loss resulting from taxpayers responding to the higher tax on income from Activity A by
substituting to Activity B. In the example above, the 1% increase on income from Activity A causes taxpayers to shift
$500,000 of income from Activity A to Activity B.176 This
$500,000 of shifted income multiplied by the tax rate differential measures the amount of revenue loss from the shift. In this
case, the differential equals 11%177 and the total revenue loss
from the shift equals $55,000.178 As a result, the 1% tax increase on income from Activity A will yield $45,000 in net additional revenues.179
the effects of tax base shifting on revenue and social costs. See id. at 10–12.
They frame the positive revenue generated from the alternative tax base
which taxpayers shift to as a “fiscal externality.” The key issue, as they define
it, in assessing the effects of base shifting is the net revenue lost due to this
fiscal externality. Id. We frame this same issue in terms of the tax rate differential—the differential between the tax rate on the initial base and on the
base into which the income shifts.
173. 30% of the $10 million base of taxable income from Activity A.
174. 20% of the $10 million base of taxable income from Activity B.
175. 1% of the unchanged $10 million base of taxable income from Activity
A.
176. That is, now taxpayers will earn only $9.5 million of income from Activity A and $10.5 million of income from Activity B.
177. The 31% rate on Activity A less the 20% rate on Activity B.
178. 11% of the $500,000 of shifted income that is now taxed at the lower
20% rate.
179. The $100,000 static revenue increase calculated in the first step less
the $55,000 revenue loss from shifting into Activity B calculated in the second
step. In this case, $9.5 million of income from Activity A is taxed at a 31% rate
and $10.5 million of income from Activity B is taxed at a 20% rate, for total tax
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The Marginal Efficiency Cost of Taxation. The revenue loss
from substitution induced by higher tax rates—reflecting the
combined effect of the elasticity of the tax bases and the tax
rate differential—can approximate what the literature terms
the “marginal efficiency cost of taxation.”180 This term
measures the efficiency cost to individuals that results from
raising a fixed amount of additional revenue from a particular
tax base.181
To understand why revenue loss from substitution can approximate the efficiency costs from raising additional revenue,
consider again the example above. In order to avoid a small tax
rate increase of 1% on income from Activity A, taxpayers respond by shifting a portion of their income from Activity A to
income from Activity B.
Prior to the tax increase, the tax rate differential between
the two bases already equaled 10%, but a differential of this
magnitude was insufficient to induce taxpayers to shift the
$500,000 of income from Activity A to Activity B.182 That is,
revenue of $5,045,000, or $45,000 more than the $5 million of revenue raised
before the tax increase.
180. See, e.g., Joel Slemrod, Methodological Issues in Measuring and Interpreting Taxable Income Elasticities, 51 NAT’L TAX J. 773, 777 (1998)
(“[T]axpayers will undertake behavior that reduces tax liability up to the point
that the marginal cost equals the marginal tax saving. In the real substitution
case, the cost is an otherwise unattractive bundle of goods. With avoidance,
the cost may be expenditures on professional assistance. With evasion, the
cost may be exposure to the uncertainty of an audit and any attendant penalties for detected evasion.”); Joel Slemrod & Shlomo Yitzhaki, The Costs of
Taxation and the Marginal Efficiency Cost of Funds, 43 IMF STAFF PAPERS
172, 186 (1996) (“The critical question is how to evaluate, from a social point of
view, the leaked dollars. . . . [A] rational taxpayer will be ready to sacrifice up
to, but no more than, one dollar in order to save a dollar of taxes.”). Importantly, the revenue loss only equals the efficiency cost under certain conditions
which will not always hold true. One is that those avoiding the tax increase
are not constrained “at a corner solution.” An example of a “corner solution” is
when a taxpayer fully shifts all income out of the tax base, in which case the
effort put into that planning may be less than the amount of taxes saved. Id.
at 186–87.
181. See, e.g., Slemrod & Yitzhaki, supra note 180, at 185 (defining the
marginal efficiency cost of funds “as the cost to the society of increasing tax
revenue by a dollar, through a change in the tax rate or other fiscal instrument”). As used in this Article, “efficiency cost” refers to the resources expended by individual taxpayers to avoid taxation.
182. They might already have shifted other income in response to the tax
rate differential, but they had not yet shifted the additional $500,000 in response to the subsequent tax increase.
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even prior to the 1% rate increase, taxpayers could have saved
$50,000 in taxes by shifting the $500,000 of income from Activity A to Activity B, but they didn’t make this shift. Shifting to
Activity B must have entailed additional effort or non-tax costs
which exceeded the $50,000 tax savings to be gained. The additional 1% increase in the tax on income from Activity A, however, induces the taxpayers to make the shift. That is, the additional $5,000 tax savings from shifting the income to Activity B
makes the shift worthwhile. Of the taxpayer’s total $55,000 in
savings from the shift, they must therefore experience a gain of
no more than $5,000, while the government loses the full
$55,000 in revenue. As a result, the net efficiency cost of the
shift (measured as the difference between the revenue loss to
the government and the benefit that the taxpayers enjoy from
tax avoidance) is between $50,000 and $55,000.183
Policymakers can then compare this cost to the net revenue
raised from the tax increase. In this case the net revenue gain
of $45,000 entailed an efficiency cost of between $50,000 and
$55,000. That is, each additional dollar of revenue raised from
increasing the rate on Activity A resulted in slightly more than
one dollar of efficiency cost.
Gaining additional revenue at a high efficiency cost may
still be desirable from the policymaker’s perspective. Whether
to undertake the trade-off depends on the effect on overall social welfare. Specifically, it depends on the trade-off between
the social value of the $45,000 in transfers, public goods, and
services that will be financed by the additional revenue versus
the social welfare loss from the $50,000 to $55,000 in efficiency
cost to the taxpayer. That trade-off can partially depend on who
receives the benefits from the revenue raised and who bears the
efficiency cost of taxation. For instance, if the efficiency costs
are borne by taxpayers at the top of the income distribution
and the revenue benefits members of society at the bottom, that
trade-off might still significantly enhance social welfare. One
view in the literature argues that the efficiency costs at the top
translate into little social welfare loss, because of the diminish183. If the taxpayers realize almost the full $5,000 benefit from the shift,
then the net social costs will be the $55,000 revenue loss less the approximately $5,000 taxpayer benefit, or $50,000. If the taxpayers realize almost none of
the benefit from the shift, then the net social cost will be the $55,000 revenue
loss less the approximately $0 taxpayer benefit, or $55,000.
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ing higher marginal utility of income and because society
should place greater weight on the welfare of the least well
off.184 More broadly, however, in the presence of a higher marginal efficiency cost of taxation, these benefits from raising additional revenue entail greater efficiency cost than they would
otherwise. Most views would agree that this scenario would be
less desirable than an alternative scenario where policymakers
can raise the same amount of revenue from the same taxpayers
at a lower efficiency cost.
The marginal efficiency cost of taxation varies with a number of factors under policymakers’ control. Policymakers might
reduce the elasticity of the tax base by reducing margins or
making it harder to shift across them.185 They might also reduce the tax differential across the margins.186 Policymakers
184. Empirical studies support for the notion that the marginal utility of
income falls on average as income rises. See, e.g., R. Layard et al., The Marginal Utility of Income, 92 J. PUB. ECON. 1846, 1857 (2008) (surveying evidence to conclude that the marginal utility of income declines on average faster than in proportion to the increase in income). But see Sarah B. Lawsky, On
the Edge: Declining Marginal Utility and Tax Policy, 95 MINN. L. REV. 904,
907–08 (2011) (agreeing that “some empirical evidence supports declining
marginal utility,” while describing how “other evidence also suggests that certain individuals actually experience increasing marginal utility, at least over
some range of income”). This assumption of declining marginal utility is often
adopted in optimal tax analysis. See, e.g., Diamond & Saez, supra note 7, at
168–70 (assuming, for purposes of calculating the optimal top tax rate, that
the “marginal social weight on consumption” is small for those at the top of the
income distribution because of the declining marginal utility of income). The
assumption of low social value from additional income at the top of the distribution can also derive from a combination of declining marginal utility of resources and simply putting less weight on the additional utility of those with
the most resources as compared to those with less. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE 52–93 (rev. ed. 1999) (defining and justifying the “difference principle” under which “the higher expectations of those better situated
are just if and only if they work as part of a scheme which improves the expectations of the least advantaged members of society”).
185. See Slemrod, supra note 180, at 779 (“[T]he characterization of an optimal tax system must include not only the tax rate structure but myriad other
instruments that subsume, but are not limited by, the definition of taxable income. The elasticity of taxable income will depend on the setting of these other
instruments. It is not an immutable function of preferences.” (emphasis omitted)); Joel Slemrod & Wojciech Kopczuk, The Optimal Elasticity of Taxable Income, 84 J. PUB. ECON. 91, 94 (2002) (describing the benefit of reducing the
elasticity of taxable income and then deriving an “optimal elasticity” based on
how a reduction trades off against other factors such as administrative costs).
186. See, e.g., infra Part IV.D.2 (describing possible rule-based solutions to
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could attempt to eliminate margins entirely and tax activity
the same187 but this approach could interfere with other normative goals such as fairness and administrative efficiency.188 In a
real-world tax system that contains margins, substitution
across those margins, and tax differentials, the “neutrality
principle” provides another way for policymakers to minimize
the marginal efficiency cost of taxation.
The Neutrality Principle. The neutrality principle generally
provides that close substitutes for the same activities should be
taxed more neutrally—with smaller tax differentials—than
should activities which are not close substitutes.189 This rule
derives from the marginal efficiency cost of taxation analysis
described above, and how this cost depends upon both the elasticity of the taxable activities and the tax rate differential between them.190 If two activities are close substitutes—and
therefore a small rate differential induces a substantial shift
from one activity to the other—policymakers should instead reduce the rate differential, even if that means increasing the
rate differential with other activities that are not close substitutes.
Consider again the example of Activity A and Activity B,
and now add a third, Activity C, which is taxed at a preferential
rate.191 Policymakers now must consider how to tax Activity A
and Activity B in light of this low rate of tax on Activity C.

“break the ratchet” by discouraging shifting across margins and reducing tax
differentials across margins).
187. See infra Part IV.D.2.
188. The only systems that would not have any margins across which taxpayers could substitute to reduce tax liability involve what are sometimes
called “lump sum” taxes or “endowment taxes”—where the tax liability is determined by immutable characteristics. See generally Lawrence Zelenak, Taxing Endowment, 55 DUKE L.J. 1145, 1148 (2006) (considering the merits of endowment taxes). For a deeper exploration of some of the trade-offs in reducing
elasticity, see Slemrod & Kopczuk, supra note 185. For a discussion of corporation integration methods, which could at least reduce—even if not eliminate—
the margins in the taxation of business income, see infra notes 313–19 and
accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 10–11 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 185–88 and accompanying text.
191. Assume that policymakers cannot or choose not to change this rate.
For example, this scenario could represent the case of Congress responding to
low taxed foreign income with a corporate rate cut, or responding to the corporate rate cut with Section 199A.
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Assume, in the extreme cases, that Activity A is a close
substitute for Activity C, but Activity B is not. In this case, Activity A should be taxed at a rate close to that for Activity C
while Activity B could potentially be taxed at a significantly
higher rate than both Activity A and Activity C. The reason for
this is that policymakers cannot gain much revenue from taxing Activity A more than Activity C and any revenue gained
from higher taxes on Activity A will entail a higher efficiency
cost. Policymakers can tax Activity B, by contrast, at a higher
rate, since it is not a substitute for Activity A or Activity C. On
the other hand, if Activity A and Activity B are close substitutes
for each other but not for Activity C, then policymakers should
tax Activity A and Activity B more neutrally, and should not
necessarily align the tax rate with the rate on Activity C. These
variations illustrate the basic point that the relative taxation of
the different activities—and the desirability for greater neutrality among them—depends on the degree to which the activities are close substitutes.192
B. THE VARYING EFFECT OF NEW TAX PREFERENCES
The neutrality framework can help explain the likely effect
of the new business tax preferences in the 2017 legislation.
This Section develops an analytical framework for evaluating
how a new preference interacts with preexisting preferences in
the tax rules. In theory, the introduction of a new preference in
this context can, in fact, be consistent with the neutrality principle—and thus decrease the efficiency cost of funds and increase the revenue that can be raised at any given set of rates.
This desirable result, however, requires careful targeting of the
new preference in a way that may practically be difficult to
achieve through the drafting of tax rules. At the same time, the
introduction of a mistargeted preference can compound the effect of the preexisting preference and result in even greater efficiency costs, and lower revenue raised, from the chosen tax
rates.

192. See also Weisbach, supra note 11, at 77 (using a similar example of an
initial distortionary tax on cars then justifying a second distortionary tax on
trucks since they are close substitutes, where the addition of the second distortionary tax on trucks reduces distortions on net).
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1. Multiple Preferences and Targeting
The neutrality framework suggests that if the tax rules already contain a preference for some sector of the base that cannot be eliminated, then additional preferences may help mitigate the efficiency costs and revenue loss resulting from the
first preference. Two (or more) preferences could be better than
one if the additional preferences result in close substitutes being treated more neutrally than are non-substitutes.
Critically, that correct application of the neutrality framework requires evaluation of the legal rules defining the various
preferences and exactly what activities they target. To properly
apply the neutrality principle, policymakers must distinguish
between preferences that improve the neutrality of the tax system (and in fact treat close substitutes more similarly) and
preferences that expand the scope of the preferences to other
portions of the tax base and therefore compound the efficiency
costs and revenue loss. The mistargeting may result from the
poor design of tax rules or the innate challenges of effectively
defining and preferencing particular activities without preferencing others as well. In the case of such mistargeting, two (or
more) preferences can be worse than just one.
A new tax preference can help mitigate the effect of another preference if: (1) the new preferential rate properly targets
activity that would otherwise shift over to another low-taxed
activity and (2) the new preferential rate is still set higher than
the rate on the other low taxed activity. Under those circumstances, a new preference effectively reduces the efficiency
costs and revenue loss from the first preferenced activity. The
opposite occurs, however, if the new preference doesn’t meet
those criteria, and is either poorly targeted to substitutable activity or offers an even larger tax benefit than one for the first
preferenced activity. In this case, the second preference will result in even higher efficiency costs and lower revenue raised
from tax increases on the remainder of the tax base.
To illustrate the different effects of properly targeted and
mistargeted preferences, and how the additional preference can
either mitigate or compound the efficiency costs and revenue
loss from the initial preference, consider again the case of Activity A and Activity B. Assume again that income from Activity
B is taxed at a fixed 20% and cannot be increased. As illustrated in Part II.A., this preference reduces the revenue-raising po-
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tential and increases the efficiency costs from a tax increase on
income from Activity A.
If policymakers cannot eliminate the preference for Activity
B, they may be able to mitigate its effect by introducing a new
preference for some subset of the taxpayers engaged in Activity
A who could in fact shift to Activity B at a relatively low cost. In
the example above, $500,000 of income shifts from Activity A to
Activity B when the tax rate on income from Activity A increases by 1% from 30% to 31%. Now, imagine that policymakers
had perfect information and knew exactly which taxpayers
would make the switch to Activity B when the tax rate on income from Activity A increases from 30% to 31%. The policymakers could then exempt those taxpayers from the tax rate
increase (call them the “Activity A 30% Cohort”). In this case,
raising the tax by 1% on the remainder of the income from Activity A produces no substitution at all—and therefore no efficiency costs—and generates $95,000 in additional revenue,193
far more than in the example above of an across-the-board rate
increase for all income from Activity A. In this case, the second
preference mitigates the effect of the progressivity ratchet resulting from the initial preference. The new preference for the
Activity A 30% Cohort could in fact justify even higher rates on
the remaining income from Activity A than would otherwise be
the case.194 This higher rate could consequently generate even
more revenue to finance government spending at a relatively
low efficiency cost.
In an ideal setting with perfect information and no administrative challenges, policymakers could develop a series of
highly targeted preferences that minimize costly substitution
responses by taxpayers. For example, even the 30% rate on income from Activity A may induce some substitution to Activity
B, which might be discouraged by lowering the rate on income
from Activity A to 29%. Policymakers could design a second
targeted preference to eliminate this shifting as well, by preferencing an “Activity A 29% Cohort.” Policymakers could make
the same adjustments to target tax preferences to any subset of
193. The 1% additional tax on the remaining $9.5 million of income from
Activity A that is not attributable to Activity A 30% Cohort.
194. Policymakers could raise the rates on the remaining income from Activity A up to the point that the higher rates induce further substitution to Activity B or other behavioral responses.
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taxpayers or activities who would otherwise switch their activity at each rate level, thus minimizing the inefficient substitution from high-taxed Activity A to low-taxed Activity B.
This policy response simply illustrates the neutrality principle, that policymakers should reduce the tax rate differential
on close substitutes. In the real-world, however, policymakers
do not have the information necessary to perfectly target tax
preferences. Policymakers may also be constrained by the innate challenges of writing tax rules that narrowly define specific taxpayers and economic activities. Imprecise targeting of tax
preferences, however, can have the adverse consequence of
compounding, rather than mitigating, the effects of an initial
preference.195 First, a poorly targeted preference can provide a
windfall to some taxpayers who would not have shifted their
activity. This lost revenue would necessitate lower government
spending or higher taxes at other points in the system. Second,
the poorly targeted preference could provide a new opportunity
for substitution that never existed before. Both of these effects
can raise the marginal efficiency cost of taxation on the remainder of the base and reduce the revenue raising potential
from higher rates.196 This is because higher taxes would be focused on a smaller base which may still be subject to the same
avoidance as before while the new preference offers taxpayers
an additional opportunity to avoid the top rate.197
Consider again the case of Activity A and Activity B, with
$10 million of income earned from each. Assume that policymakers attempt to mitigate the effects of a preference for income from Activity B by creating a new category of tax, called
“Activity A Preferred” which is taxed at a 25% rate. Policymakers draft complex rules to differentiate between Activity A and
Activity A Preferred, attempting to target those taxpayers most
195. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
196. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
197. This example illustrates how the 1% rate increase on the residual
base will end up raising less revenue and at a greater efficiency cost than before. The efficiency cost is amplified if the revenue loss from the “windfall” tax
cut is recovered through other tax rate increases which would generate yet
more substitution. The revenue loss and welfare cost associated with a given
change in the tax rate would rise further as rates increase. In other words, the
next percentage point tax increase would tend to cause even more substitution
than the last one, as under certain conditions the distortion generated by tax
rate differentials is proportional to the square of the rate differential. See
ROSEN & GAYER, supra note 10, at 554.

1544

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[104:1499

likely to shift from Activity A to Activity B as a result of a further increase in the tax rate. Have the policymakers mitigated
the negative effects of the preference for Activity B by creating
a situation where higher taxes on income from Activity A would
raise more revenue at a lower efficiency cost? This depends
whether the policymakers effectively targeted the new preference.
First, consider the case of complete mistargeting. In this
situation, the preference would provide a windfall to any taxpayers who automatically qualify for Activity A Preferred even
though they would not have substituted toward Activity B in
response to a 1% rate increase on income from Activity A. Assume that the windfall encompasses one-fourth, or $2.5 million,
of the Activity A tax base, leaving a residual base of $7.5 million in Activity A who do not automatically qualify for the new
preference.
The 1% tax rate increase on income from Activity A would
then, before taking into account any additional substitution,
apply to this smaller residual base. If no further substitution
occurred, this 1% increase would raise $75,000 in additional
revenue. Because of the complete mistargeting, however, the
same $500,000 in income would still substitute from Activity A
to Activity B, reducing revenue by $55,000.198 Also assume that,
due to the mistargeting, an additional $200,000 of income now
shifts from Activity A to Activity A Preferred, reducing revenue
by an additional $12,000,199 leaving a tax base of only $6.8 million in Activity A. Altogether, the substitution reduces revenue
by $67,000, and the net revenue raised falls to $8,000.200 The
tax increase raises relatively little revenue at a relatively high

198. The $500,000 that shifts from Activity A to Activity B multiplied by
the tax rate differential on these bases of 11%.
199. The $200,000 that shifts from Activity A to Activity A Preferred multiplied by the tax rate differential on these bases of 6%.
200. Before the 1% increase on income from Activity A, this package of
rates would tax $7.5 million of income from Activity A at 30%, $2.5 million of
income from Activity A Preferred at 25%, and $10 million of income from Activity B at 20%, for total revenue raised of $4,875,000. After the 1% increase induces additional shifting from Activity A, the package of rates would tax $6.8
million of income from Activity A at 31%, $2.7 million of income from Activity
A Preferred at 25%, and $10.5 million of income from Activity B at 20%, for total revenue raised of $4,883,000, or only $8000 more than before the 1% rate
increase.
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efficiency cost.201 In this case, the poorly targeted preference
substantially compounds—rather than mitigates—the effect of
the initial preference for Activity B.
By contrast, assume the policymakers more accurately—
though still imperfectly—target Activity A Preferred to the desired group of taxpayers. In this case, Activity A Preferred primarily benefits the taxpayers who would otherwise shift from
Activity A to Activity B if the rate of tax on income from Activity
A increases. Assume that Activity A Preferred automatically
preferences only $500,000 of income from Activity A, leaving
$9.5 million in the residual Activity A base. Further, assume
that most of that $500,000 would otherwise have shifted from
Activity A to Activity B if the rate on income from Activity A increased further. In this case, a 1% tax increase on this residual
in Activity A, before accounting for further shifting, would raise
$95,000 of revenue. Assume that, because the preference is
more accurately targeted, the 1% tax increase on income from
Activity A only results in a shift of $100,000 of income from the
residual Activity A to Activity B, and only $50,000 from Activity
A to Activity A Preferred. The revenue loss from the substitution would now only be $14,000,202 and the net revenue raised
from the tax rate changes would increase to $81,000.203
In this case, the addition of Activity A Preferred mitigated
the adverse effects of the Activity B tax preference. Additional
revenue can now be raised from Activity A at a lower efficiency
201. In this case, the efficiency cost to the taxpayer from the additional
substitution would be between $60,000 and $67,000. This reflects the fact that
taxpayers substituting chose not to make the switch to Activity A and Activity
A Preferred at the previous tax differentials of 10% and 5% respectively—
meaning that there must have been transaction costs that outweighed the tax
benefits at the previous differentials.
202. The $100,000 that shifts from Activity A to Activity B times the tax
rate differential on these bases of 11%, plus the $50,000 that shifts from Activity A to Activity A Preferred, times the tax rate differential on these bases of
6%.
203. In this case, before the 1% increase on income Activity A, this package
of rates would tax $9.5 million of income from Activity A at 30%, $500,000 of
income from Activity A Preferred at 25%, and $10 million of income from Activity B at 20%, for total revenue raised of $4,975,000. After the 1% increase induces a minimal degree of additional shifting from Activity A, the package of
rates would tax $9,350,000 of income from Activity A at 31%, $550,000 of income from Activity A Preferred at 25%, and $10.1 million of income from Activity B at 20%, for total revenue raised of $5,056,000, or $81,000 more than before the 1% rate increase.
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cost than was possible before the introduction of the preference.204
These examples illustrate how a new preference can either
mitigate or compound the negative effects from an initial preference—the higher efficiency cost and less revenue raised from
taxes on other portions of the tax base. This varying effect of a
new preference depends on the legal rules defining the preference, and whether it is effectively targeted to the activities that
would have otherwise shifted into the previously preferenced
activity.
2. Multiple Preferences with a Choice in Tax Systems
This framework for evaluating when a new preference introduced in response to an initial preference compounds or mitigates the effects of an initial preference may be expanded to
consider the case of a choice in tax systems. Applying the
framework in this scenario also helps explain why it is a mistake to pursue average rate neutrality across the corporate and
pass-through systems, as is sometimes suggested.205 In fact,
this mistaken pursuit can increase the efficiency costs of raising revenue in both systems for the same reason that poorly
targeted new preferences would have this effect in the general
case described in the preceding Section.
By “choice in tax systems,” this Article refers to the ability
of taxpayers to select different methods for measuring and taxing the same activities. There may be independent reasons why
the tax rules should allow a choice of tax systems in certain
cases. Taxing some taxpayers and their activities in one system
and others in another may provide administrative and compliance benefits to both taxpayers and the government. For example, as described above, the corporate tax system is often justified as a more administrable method of taxing large entities
with many owners and frequent changes in ownership.206 Offering taxpayers and entities a choice between tax systems may be

204. The social cost would be between $12,500 and $14,000, again reflecting the fact that the revenue-losing substitution was not undertaken at the
prior rate differentials.
205. See, e.g., Holtz-Eakin Testimony, supra note 116; 2012 JOINT REPORT,
supra note 118, at 7.
206. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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desirable if it allows them to select into the most administratively efficient systems for their circumstances.
If policymakers decide to preserve a choice in tax system,
they must then determine how rates in the two systems should
relate. One approach would be to closely align the tax rates in
the two systems for each individual taxpayer and activity, so
that the choice between systems doesn’t generate opportunities
for tax-reducing substitution. This approach might not be feasible, however, if the administrative benefits from preserving
separate systems require differential tax treatment of at least
some activities.207 If policymakers must accept differential tax
treatment of some activities across the two systems, they must
then determine how to the optimize tax rates across the systems. The neutrality principle described above applies here as
well: treat close substitutes more similarly, as compared to activities that are not close substitutes. The neutrality principle
does not suggest, however, that policymakers should equalize
average rates across the two systems. This approach can in fact
violate the neutrality principle and compound the revenue loss
and efficiency costs resulting from taxpayer’s substitution responses.
For example, consider the scenario in Table 1 below, with
two activities, Activity A and Activity B, which can each be
taxed under System 1 or System 2. System 1 and System 2 both
tax Activity A at the same 30% rate. System 1 also taxes Activity B at a 30% rate, but System 2 taxes Activity B at a preferenced 20% rate.208 To improve neutrality between the two systems, policymakers then consider introducing a new preference
in System 1: a lower 25% rate on income from “Activity A Preferred” which is a subset of Activity A.

207. Part IV.D.2 revisits this option of aligning tax rates for activities and
taxpayers across the two systems by considering proposals to “integrate” the
pass-through and corporate systems. This approach could align tax rates while
retaining some of the administrative benefits from having two systems. See
infra notes 312–18 and accompanying text.
208. Assume, for example, that the administrative advantages of a separate System 2 also necessitate a lower tax on Activity B in System 2. One realworld example of such a preference could be the corporate system’s deferral
opportunities, which may allow taxpayers to reduce or eliminate the second
individual layer of tax.

1548

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[104:1499

Table 1: Illustration of a Choice in Tax Systems
System 1

System 2

Activity A

30%

30%

Activity B

30%

20%

Reform Option:
“Activity A Preferred” in
System 1

25%

30%

The introduction of the preference for Activity A Preferred
may achieve greater average rate neutrality between the two
systems.209 This fact, however, is immaterial for purposes of
properly applying the neutrality principle. The analysis of
whether the introduction of the preference for Activity A Preferred follows the same structure as the analysis of any new
preference introduced in response to an initial preference, as
described in the preceding Section.
Properly applying the neutrality principle in this case similarly requires evaluating whether Activity A Preferred effectively targets activity that would otherwise substitute from Activity
A (in either System 1 or 2) to Activity B in System 2. If Activity
A Preferred effectively targets income likely to shift, then the
lower tax rate on Activity A Preferred would help mitigate the
efficiency costs and revenue losses that the preference for Activity B in System 2 generates on the top tax rates in both systems. If, however, Activity A Preferred does not effectively target income likely to shift, it will instead increase the tax
reduction opportunities for income in both systems and worsen

209. Assuming Activity A and Activity B each produce equal amounts of income under each system prior to the reform, then the average rate under System 1 would be 30% while the average rate under System 2 would be 25%. After the introduction of the preference for Activity A Preferred in System 1, the
average rate in this system would be lower than 30% and closer to the average
rate in System 2.
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the efficiency costs and revenue losses resulting from the preference for Activity B in System 2.
This example illustrates how a new preference that may
bring average tax rates across two tax systems closer together
could either compound or mitigate the effects of an initial preference. Stated differently, the end result might be something
closer to average rate neutrality across the systems but a
greater tax differential between close substitutes, which is
what matters. Thus, pursuing average tax rate neutrality
across choice-in-tax systems could violate—rather than follow—the neutrality principle. Policymakers should instead
evaluate whether a new preference effectively targets income
that would otherwise shift toward preferenced activity in either
system.
C. DOES NEUTRALITY MATTER?
The analysis so far has expanded on the traditional neutrality principle in the public finance literature to explain how
the introduction of a preference in response to another preference might either mitigate or compound the inefficiency costs
and revenue loss generated by the first preference. As explained in Part IV, the new business tax preferences in the
2017 legislation constitute violations of the neutrality principle,
as it should be properly understood.
However, this traditional optimal tax analysis does not fully capture the likely harm that results from mistargeted preferences of this kind. Raising a given amount of revenue at
greater efficiency cost is less desirable under most views, if
there is an alternative option to raise the same amount of revenue at a lower efficiency cost. In this case, the efficiency cost is
simply wasted resources.
The degree of social concern with these efficiency costs may
vary, however, depending on who bears these costs. If the additional efficiency costs are borne only by the wealthiest taxpayers, then these costs may not constitute a significant social welfare loss. In fact, some methods of aggregating social welfare
would suggest that this doesn’t matter much at all to society at
large, if taxpayers at the top derive less utility from additional
resources.210 Frameworks like this would suggest that the
210. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
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wealthiest taxpayers are already significantly under-taxed.
Raising the same amount of revenue from these taxpayers in a
less efficient fashion might not be a beneficial policy reform,
but it would not have a significant negative effect on aggregate
social welfare.
As the next Part explains, however, the harm from higher
efficiency costs from taxing the wealthy could increase if policymakers face other constraints in increasing the progressivity
of the tax system to offset revenue loss from poorly targeted
preferences. Part III connects the optimal tax analysis to an
analysis grounded in political economy, and the real-world constraints on enacting tax policy. This discussion explains how,
by increasing the efficiency cost of additional revenue, mistargeted preferences benefiting the wealthiest taxpayers could
lead to less revenue collected from the top, resulting in a progressivity ratchet that constrains the progressive potential of
the tax system overall.
III. THE PROGRESSIVITY RATCHET
This Part builds upon the basic principles from the public
finance literature laid out in Part II—and their extension to the
case of a new preference introduced in response to an initial
preference. It describes how a violation of the “neutrality principle” might lead to the political decision to generate less revenue from the highest income taxpayers, and therefore to accept
a less progressive income tax system. In this respect, the progressivity ratchet results from an interaction of the effects of
tax avoidance and the preferences of lawmakers and their constituents. Specifically, this Part describes three political constraints that, in combination with tax preferences allowing
greater opportunities for tax avoidance, can generate the progressivity ratchet.
The progressivity ratchet suggests a harm from preferences that increase tax avoidance opportunities beyond those
described in the traditional optimal tax literature. According to
this literature, preferences that violate the neutrality principle
will result in lower revenue raised, at a higher efficiency cost,
from tax increases on other portions of the tax base.211 This
general harm—which is central in an optimal income tax anal211. See supra notes 165–92 and accompanying text.
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ysis—is not this Article’s central concern. Rather, the concern
underlying the progressivity ratchet is as follows: if the preferences creating new opportunities for tax avoidance are maintained, policymakers may then choose over time to raise less
revenue from the highest income taxpayers because of the political constraints described in this Part.
In the absence of these constraints, violating the neutrality
principle and increasing tax planning might not have this adverse effect on progressivity. Policymakers might simply choose
to increase tax rates on the highest income taxpayers to offset
the revenue loss from increased tax avoidance, irrespective of
the efficiency costs to those taxpayers. The discussion that follows describes, however, how the progressivity ratchet will
arise in the presence of the three constraints, and suggests why
they may be plausible factors resulting in a political choice to
have a less progressive tax system, with less revenue raised
from the top and less resources then available to the rest. This
discussion also explains how the progressivity ratchet can operate in the reverse fashion in the presence of these constraints: higher taxes on a portion of the tax base can enable
more revenue to be raised overall considering the effects on the
remainder of the tax base.
A. THE THREE CONSTRAINTS
1. The Efficiency Cost Constraint
The first condition, the “efficiency cost constraint,” follows
directly from the marginal efficiency cost of taxation analysis
described above. In an optimal tax model, a higher marginal efficiency cost of taxation implies a lower optimal tax rate on a
given base, and a lower amount of revenue that should be
raised and then spent on the uses of tax revenues: public goods,
services, and redistribution.212 This conclusion results from a
simple logic: when certain taxes generate higher efficiency costs
to certain taxpayers, raising these taxes—and thereby funding
the government programs that they finance213—entails a high212. See, e.g., Slemrod, supra note 180, at 776–80 (describing the relationship among the marginal efficiency cost of funds, the elasticity of taxable income, and the optimal amount of redistribution and purchase of public goods).
213. Assuming, of course, that the government cannot finance the programs through other taxes or debt financing on a permanent basis. That is,
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er price paid in the form of greater efficiency costs. This was
the dynamic explained in Part II. Thus, a higher marginal efficiency cost suggests policymakers should choose to raise less
revenue than they would otherwise in order to limit spending
to areas generating higher social benefits that justify the higher cost of raising revenue.
Policymakers do not strictly operate in an optimal tax
model. If they did, the tax system would surely look very different than it does now, and the business tax preferences would
not exist in the first place.214 Nonetheless, policymakers may
still be sensitive to the efficiency loss from raising additional
revenue in some circumstances. Specifically, they may in some
ways weigh the amount of harm imposed on certain constituents—like certain well-to-do constituents—relative to the revenue raised which can be used for public spending and redistribution.
Returning to the example above,215 it may be that, from a
policymaker’s perspective, a 1% increase on income from Activity A is not “worth it” given the efficiency cost resulting from the
additional revenue raised. The welfare gain from an additional
$45,000 in public goods, government services, or redistribution
funded by the tax may not justify the approximately $50,000 to
$55,000 in efficiency costs imposed on the taxpayers—who may
object to not just the $45,000 in additional taxes they pay, but
also the $50,000 to $55,000 in efficiency costs they incur.216
Policymakers are likely sensitive to the efficiency costs of
taxation, particularly in the case of high efficiency costs. Efficiency is generally considered a basic principle of tax policy design,217 and concerns of efficiency may affect policy outcomes
even when policymakers are not wholly committed to an optithis simple presentation holds constant the availability to generate revenue
from other sources.
214. See infra Part IV (describing the problems with the new business
preferences from an optimal tax perspective).
215. See supra notes 181–88 and accompanying text.
216. That is, from the government’s perspective, the tax raises $45,000 in
additional revenue, but from the taxpayer’s perspective it imposes up to
$100,000 of total costs. Of course, these same taxpayers may similarly object
to a perfectly efficient tax that imposes a cost on them that is exactly equal to
the amount of revenue raised.
217. For a formative articulation of the centrality of efficiency to tax policy
analysis, see ARTHUR M. OKUN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY: THE BIG
TRADEOFF (2015).
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mal income tax framework.218 Academic research suggests that
policymakers are also likely to be more responsive to the preferences of the wealthy.219 In this case, policymakers may tend
to overweight the concerns of wealthy taxpayers who bear efficiency costs from taxation, even if the tax would otherwise be
warranted because the welfare gains from the revenue raised
(and spent or redistributed) would justify these efficiency costs
to the wealthy. In fact, this research suggests a concern that
policymakers may be overly responsive to these effects at the
top of the income distribution, and not sensitive enough to the
benefits that others members of society may receive as a result
of the additional tax revenue raised.220
218. Professor James Poterba has argued, for example, that efficiency
analysis plays an independent role in the political economy of tax policymaking. See James M. Poterba, Public Finance and Public Choice, 51 NAT’L TAX J.
391, 395 (1998) (arguing that, even in the political arena where outcomes depend on “equating the marginal political costs” of different policies, “efficiencybased tax policy analyses can provide a crucial input to the policy process by
identifying aspects of the current or prospective tax code that impose substantial efficiency costs”); cf. Neil. H. Buchanan, The Role of Economics in Tax
Scholarship, in BEYOND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY IN UNITED STATES TAX LAW
11, 22 (David A. Brennan et al., eds., 2013) (arguing that acknowledging the
limitations of “efficiency analysis” in tax policy “still leaves plenty of room for
the use of ‘economic tools’ to assess policies”).
219. See, e.g., MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE & INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND POLITICAL POWER IN AMERICA 70–97 (2012) (describing the increased responsiveness of government policy to the preferences of high income
members of society); KAY LEHMAN SCHOLZMAN ET AL., THE UNHEAVENLY
CHORUS: UNEQUAL POLITICAL VOICE AND THE BROKEN PROMISE OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY (2012) (describing the correlation between “political voice” and
policy outputs); Daniel P. Tokaji, Vote Dissociation, 127 YALE. L.J.F. 761, 772
(2018) (describing academic research finding “that well-financed interest
groups exercise outsized influence on public policy”).
220. A possible alternative to this theory could justify maintaining preferences that increase the marginal efficiency cost of funds as a way to facilitate
progressive outcomes. Cf. Stanley L. Winer & Walter Hettich, What Is Missed
if We Leave Out Collective Choice in the Analysis of Taxation?, 51 NAT’L TAX J.
373, 384 (1998) (“In a competitive political system, governments create special
provisions as a way of taking differing economic and political responses to taxation into account, while economizing on administration costs. This suggests
that those special provisions that were introduced to make the tax system administratively or politically more efficient should be preserved rather than
eliminated.”). Specifically, it is possible that taxpayers benefitting from the
preferences are particularly politically powerful subgroup. As a result, eliminating the preferences and including these taxpayers in a base subject to potential tax increases might reduce the chance of such tax increases succeeding,
even if the tax increases would now be more efficient than they would other-
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In the presence of this constraint, new preferences for
business income can make higher progressive rates on individual income more costly from the perspective of policymakers,
because the new preferences would induce taxpayers to incur
further costs in order to change their behavior and access preferential treatment.221 The preference for one portion of the tax
base would thus constrain policymakers’ ability to increase
marginal rates—and thereby the degree of progressivity—on
other portions of the tax base.
2. The Salience of Tax Rates Constraint
The second condition, “the salience of tax rates constraint,”
does not depend on a concern by policymakers or their constituents with the efficiency costs of taxation. This constraint depends instead on policymakers’ sensitivity to the “sticker price”
of the top marginal rates, whether reflecting their own preferences or those of their constituents. In this scenario, policymakers may be unable to simply increase tax rates on portions
of the base in order to offset the revenue loss from preferential
rates and the tax avoidance they generate.
This constraint is related to the “efficiency cost constraint,”
because it also describes a scenario where policymakers encounter a political cost to raising tax rates. Under the salience
of tax rate constraint, however, policymakers may be unable to
raise the rates even if there is little efficiency cost associated
with a further tax rate increase. Rather, this constraint results
from the unique political salience of the top statutory tax rates,

wise be with the preference. In this scenario the net efficiency cost to taxpayers subject to tax would be lower, but political difficulty could be greater. Different subgroups of the wealthiest taxpayers may have greater or lesser political influence on tax policy, as reflected by the fact that in many cases some
wealthy taxpayers receive unique tax preferences that others do not. This possibility does not suggest, however, that the power among the rich is so fragmented that an inefficient preference for some subgroup of the wealthy will
lead to more revenue raised from the rich as a whole, and an overall more progressive tax system. Policymakers will be faced with the fact that raising that
revenue entails greater efficiency burden on at least some of the rich. Further,
policymakers face additional constraints—such as “the salience of tax rates
constraint” discussed in the following Section—that increase the likelihood
that such inefficient preferences lead to less overall progressivity, rather than
more.
221. See infra Parts IV.A–B.
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and the limitations policymakers may face in raising more revenue by increasing these rates.
Evidence suggests that policymakers may perceive higher
costs to increasing the progressivity of the tax system by raising the statutory tax rates, instead of through other changes to
the tax rules. For example, Professor Deborah Schenk has argued that policymakers may not be able to raise revenue by increasing top marginal rates directly, because this salient method of increasing taxes would face greater obstacles from
interest groups, institutional barriers in Congress, and the
rhetoric of anti-tax objectors.222 In this case, Professor Schenk
argues, policymakers may be justified if they instead pursue
lower-salience taxes as a “second-best” solution.223
For one example of the “stickiness” of the top marginal tax
rates, consider the recent history of the top marginal rate on
individual ordinary income. Before the changes in the 2017 legislation, ordinary income was taxed at top rate of 39.6%, which
was the highest statutory tax rate on ordinary income in any
year since 1986.224 Congress first raised the rate to that level in
the 1993 budget bill.225 In 2001, Congress scheduled the rate to
phase down to 35%,226 then restored the same 39.6% rate in
2013,227 and then cut the rate again to the current 37% in the
2017 tax legislation.228 The 39.6% rate is of course somewhat
arbitrary and originated in the particular way that the Clinton
administration framed its 1993 tax rate increase which was no
222. Deborah H. Schenk, Exploiting the Salience Bias in Designing Taxes,
28 YALE J. REG. 253, 299–310 (2011). For a review of empirical work on the
political salience of different forms of taxation, see David Gamage & Darien
Shanske, Three Essays On Tax Salience: Market Salience and Political Salience, 65 TAX L. REV. 19, 33–54 (2011).
223. Schenk, supra note 222, at 310 (“[T]here are situations where [lowsalience tax provisions] may enable the government to achieve otherwise worthy goals. So long as the process is reasonably transparent . . . there is no convincing argument that it would be wrong for the government to . . . [use] politically pleasing taxes or provisions.”).
224. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66,
§ 13202, 107 Stat. 312.
225. Id.
226. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L.
No. 107-16, § 101, 115 Stat. 38, 42.
227. American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, § 101, 126
Stat. 2313, 2316 (2013).
228. The 2017 Tax Legislation, supra note 1, § 11001 (codified at I.R.C.
§ 199A (2017)).
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longer relevant in 2013 when this same rate was restored.229
Nonetheless, the 39.6% rate has continued to be a focal point of
political discussion over tax reform.230
Similarly, during an earlier round of tax increases in 1990,
Congress had to seek other ways to increase progressivity rather than by simply raising the statutory rate. President
George H.W. Bush agreed to raise revenues as part of a bipartisan deficit reduction deal, but, to the degree possible, did not
want to do so through an explicit statutory rate increase, because of his campaign pledge not to raise tax rates.231 The solution was limiting the deductibility of itemized deductions for
high income taxpayers, which effectively functioned as a marginal rate increase even if it wasn’t written as such in the
law.232 The author of the provision in Congress explicitly described this solution “as a face-saving way for the President to
raise taxes without technically raising the tax rates.”233 Of
course, if Congress had many available ways to continue to
229. In 1993, President Clinton proposed two new higher ordinary income
tax brackets—a 36% rate and a 39.6% rate. The 39.6% rate was framed specifically as a 10% surcharge on the highest incomes (10% x 36% + 36% = 39.6%).
See Ruth Marcus & Ann Devroy, Asking American To ‘Face Facts,’ Clinton
Presents Plan To Raise Taxes, Cut Deficit, WASH. POST (Feb. 18, 1993),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/states/stories/
sou021893.htm [https://perma.cc/J5PY-5LD7]. That framing had fallen away
by 2013. The 2013 law did not even restore the 36% bracket; instead, the second highest bracket was 35%. The 39.6% rate had taken on a separate logic of
its own and the focal point as President Obama sought to repeal elements of
the tax cuts in the 2000s.
230. For example, the infrastructure plan released by Senate Democrats in
March, 2018 called for restoring the top marginal rate to exactly the same
39.6% in effect before the 2017 legislation. SENATE DEMOCRATS, JOBS & INFRASTRUCTURE PLAN FOR AMERICA’S WORKERS: RETURNING THE REPUBLICAN
TAX GIVEAWAYS FOR THE WEALTHY TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE (March 7,
2018), https://www.democrats.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Senate%20Democrats’
%20Jobs%20and%20Infrastructure%20Plan.pdf [https://perma.cc/N33S
-NQ4R].
231. See Nathaniel C. Nash, Deducting from Deductions of the Wealthier
Taxpayers, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 1990), https://www.nytimes.com/1990/10/23/
us/the-budget-battle-deducting-from-deductions-of-the-wealthier-taxpayers
.html.
232. See Schenk, supra note 222, at 277–78 (“[The itemized deduction limitation] is exactly the same as if Congress had raised the rate one percentage
point. That of course would have been much simpler, but at the time it was
also politically difficult to do.”).
233. Nash, supra note 231.
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raise rates without explicitly doing so in the tax rate tables, the
“salience of tax rates” constraint may not significantly constrain progressive reforms, but such mechanisms are in limited
supply. More importantly, the episode from 1990 again helps
illustrate the particular political salience of statutory tax rates,
and why policymakers may be more successful in adjusting tax
burdens through other changes to the tax Code.
This constraint relates to the progressivity ratchet as follows. For any chosen top statutory rate on a portion of the tax
base, preferences on other portions of the tax base that increase
opportunities for taxpayers to avoid the top marginal rate will
result in less revenue raised from that top rate. Of course, the
preference for a portion of the base will reduce revenue, by explicitly reducing the amount of the base subject to the top rate.
This effect is magnified, however, as economic activity subject
to the residual high-tax base shifts to the preferenced base,
through the process described in Part II above. If policymakers
cannot compensate by further increasing the top marginal
rates, because of the salience of this form of tax increases, the
preferences for a portion of the tax base will constrain overall
progressivity as rates on the remainder of the base will not rise
enough to offset the revenue loss from poorly targeted preferences.
3. The Revenue-Maximizing Rate Constraint
The third condition, “the revenue-maximizing rate constraint” describes the scenario where policymakers determine
to tax the wealthy at the revenue maximizing rate—the rate
where additional rate increases will not generate any more revenue. At that point, policymakers simply cannot raise rates further to offset revenue loss from preferences for a portion.234
In this scenario, the progressive revenue-raising potential
from this top rate will depend, in part, on whether taxpayers
have an opportunity to shift from the higher-taxed base to a
preferenced base. Even in the absence of such tax avoidance,
the fact that part of the base isn’t fully subject to the tax rate
234. That is, in the case of the salience of tax rates constraint, policymakers cannot raise the top marginal rate because of the political salience of rate
increases. In the case of the “revenue-maximizing rate constraint,” policymakers cannot raise the top marginal rate because doing so would not generate
additional revenue.
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increase would lower revenue. This effect is then magnified to
the degree that taxpayers can substitute across the tax bases
and shift away from the base subject to the higher rates.
The revenue-maximizing rate on a base varies with the
amount of tax avoidance generated for any additional rate increase.235 As the avoidance opportunities increase, the revenuemaximizing rate—and the revenue raised from this maximum
rate—decreases.
This constraint would bind policymakers irrespective of
whether the tax avoidance results in significant efficiency costs.
Even if the taxpayer can avoid the higher rate at a low cost
(and thus would even incur these costs at lower top rates), this
behavior will still result in less revenue raised, and less overall
progressivity resulting from the revenue maximizing rates. For
the same reason, the constraint also binds policymakers even if
they are not concerned with the efficiency costs incurred by the
taxpayers subject to tax rate increases.236
According to some views in the literature, policymakers
may be justified in setting top tax rates at or close to the revenue-maximizing rate. As described above, some scholars have
argued that efficiency costs at the top of the distribution should
not translate into social welfare loss, because there may be little social value in additional resources for the wealthiest taxpayers.237 In that case, tax rates should be set at the revenue
maximizing point, and the only social welfare losses from tax
avoidance would result from the reduced revenue raised for the
government and available for redistribution and public spending.238
As suggested above, policymakers do not necessarily operate in an optimal tax model. Irrespective of motive, however,
policymakers will be bound by “the revenue maximizing rate
constraint” if they raise rates sufficiently high, and preferences

235. This follows from the basic principle that the revenue leakage from
taxation will vary with the elasticity of the base subject to tax. See Saez et al.,
supra note 165, at 8.
236. That is, the net result from the policymaker’s perspective would again
be lower revenue raised at the revenue-maximizing rate, irrespective of
whether the revenue loss results from large or small efficiency costs incurred
by the taxpayers.
237. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
238. See, e.g., Diamond & Saez, supra note 7, at 168–70.
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that increase the opportunities for tax avoidance lower the potential ceiling of this revenue-maximizing rate.
The revenue-maximizing rate constraint is only relevant
under a much more progressive income tax system with higher
top margin rates. In the case of ordinary income tax rates, evidence suggests that this revenue-maximizing rate would be
significantly higher than under current law.239 Economists Peter Diamond and Emmanuel Saez estimate that this optimal
revenue-maximizing rate would be approximately 73%.240 This
revenue-maximizing rate, however, depends on the tax avoidance opportunities available to taxpayers. The 2017 legislation’s business tax preferences—and the new tax avoidance opportunities that they introduced—likely reduced this revenuemaximizing rate, and therefore the amount of revenue that can
be raised from the wealthiest taxpayers at this revenuemaximizing rate.241 This constraint is likely irrelevant for
smaller tax rate changes based on rates today, but would be
relevant for larger ones, including such proposals as the one introduced by Representative Ocasio-Cortez.242
B. PATH DEPENDENCY IN THE TAX SYSTEM
This discussion does not intend to suggest that political
outcomes—or constraints—are inevitable. These constraints—
particularly the “efficiency cost constraint” and “the salience of
tax rates constraint”—are functions of politics, and preferences
of policymakers and constituents, which can and do change.
Some policymakers may feel more bound by some of these constraints than others. With that said, evidence suggests that
these constraints do exist in the political process.243
In the same vein, the business preferences that are the
subject of this Article are themselves the product of their own
political forces and constraints, but these business tax preferences need not be considered inevitable outcomes of the political process. After all, they are new to the tax system as of the

239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

Id. at 171.
Id.
The 2017 Tax Legislation, supra note 1.
Stracqualursi, supra note 6; supra note 6 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 217–20, 222–33, 236–39 and accompanying text.
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2017 legislation and after passage remained unpopular with a
significant portion of the electorate.244
These three constraints ultimately suggest a political path
dependency—where the introduction of new tax preferences
can decrease the probability of future progressive tax changes,
assuming those preferences are maintained. Policymakers
seeking to increase the progressivity of the tax system—and,
specifically, the revenue raised from the wealthiest taxpayers—
should seek to “reverse the ratchet” in order to reduce the
probability that their effort will run aground on these barriers.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR TAX REFORM
This Part considers the implications of the progressivity
ratchet—and how its effect depends on the particular legal
rules defining the scope of new tax preferences—for evaluating
the 2017 tax legislation and the future of progressive tax design.
Sections A and B first describe how the progressivity
ratchet suggests an alternative assessment of the corporate
rate reduction and Section 199A. As described above, critiques
of the 2017 tax legislation in the literature have generally focused on its explicit distributional effects and the design of Section 199A.245 At the same time, the corporate rate reduction received measured praise as a response to lower rates in foreign
jurisdictions.246 This Part reconsiders these assessments. In
short, the corporate rate reduction and the pass-through deduction can both be understood as similarly mistargeted responses
to low tax rates elsewhere in the system that were introduced
in order to improve “neutrality” along specific margins in the
tax law. Both changes will likely have the similar effect of increasing the efficiency cost of taxation and, because of political
economy constraints, locking in a less progressive tax system
over time—if these structures are retained.
Section C then describes how the progressivity ratchet in
the 2017 legislation will obstruct future progressive tax reforms, such as recent proposals to raise the marginal rates on
244. Megan Brenan, More Still Disapprove than Approve of 2017 Tax Cuts,
GALLUP (Oct. 10, 2018), https://news.gallup.com/poll/243611/disapprove
-approve-2017-tax-cuts.aspx [https://perma.cc/JSH5-URCZ].
245. See supra Part I.C.
246. See supra Part I.C.
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ordinary income earned by the wealthiest taxpayers. This analysis also explains the deeper distributional consequences of the
changes in the 2017 legislation. Finally, Section D evaluates
different reform options to “reverse the ratchet,” which would
in turn facilitate future progressive reforms.
A. REEVALUATING THE CORPORATE RATE REDUCTION
Many commentators on the 2017 tax legislation considered
the corporate rate reduction something of a saving grace in an
otherwise flawed bill. As described above, proponents argued
that the corporate rate reduction would improve neutrality in
the tax system and discourage U.S. MNCs from shifting income
to low-tax jurisdictions by changing the location of reported
profits or real economic investment.247 This assessment, however, focuses narrowly on the corporate system in the international context. It fails to take into account the effects on the
broader tax system—including both the significant opportunities for domestic tax avoidance that the low corporate rate generates and the ways in which a low corporate rate is likely to
constrain the overall progressivity of the tax system due to the
ratchet effect we describe.
First, the corporate rate reduction may not be justified under a traditional application of the neutrality rule and the optimal tax framework. The domestic and foreign profits of MNCs
turn out not to be close substitutes, even after the corporate
rate reduction. This might come as a surprise. After all, MNCs
do shift large amounts of profits to foreign jurisdictions from
the United States.248 Kimberly Clausing estimates that in 2015
U.S. MNCs shifted approximately $309 to $379 billion in profits from the United States to lower-taxed foreign jurisdictions.249 The corporate rate cut, however, may not meaningfully
reduce profit shifting. For instance, Clausing estimates that
cutting the U.S. corporate rate to 21% would only reduce the
amount of shifted profits by $50 billion (resulting in a net revenue gain of only about $11 billion).250 The Congressional Budg247. See supra Part I.C.1.
248. See Kimberly Clausing, Profit Shifting Before and After the Tax Cuts
and Jobs Act 12–13 (Jan. 29, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers
.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3274827 [https://perma.cc/2J3V-93KM].
249. Id. at 13.
250. Id. at 30.
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et Office similarly estimates that the 2017 legislation as a
whole, including base protection measures and behavioral
changes of foreign corporations, would reduce profit shifting out
of the United States by only about $65 billion per year on average over the next eleven years—with the corporate rate cut responsible for only some portion of that amount.251 One leading
analyst of international capital flows finds, based on early post2017 data, that the corporate rate reduction might have had
virtually no effect on profit shifting.252
The reason for this modest expected reduction in profit
shifting is that most MNCs shift profits to very low-tax countries. As a result, even with the lower U.S. corporate rate, these
companies may still benefit from reporting profits abroad.253
Thus, an even larger corporate rate reduction (entailing an
even greater net revenue loss and ratchet effect across the rest
of the tax system) would be necessary to induce MNCs to report
these mobile profits in the United States. At the rates introduced in the 2017 tax legislation, however, taxpayers may still
benefit by shifting profits to foreign jurisdictions.
The corporate rate reduction also may not have a significant effect in discouraging investment abroad and encouraging
investment in the United States, because the location of real
251. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: 2018
2028, at 124 (2018), https://www.cbo.gov/publication/53651 [https://perma
.cc/R8KY-WN4X].
252. See Brad Setser, Opinion, The Global Con Hidden in Trump’s Tax Reform Law, Revealed, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/
02/06/opinion/business-economics/trump-tax-reform-state-of-the-union-2019
.html [https://perma.cc/KM6Z-6RWB] (“The global distribution of corporations’
offshore profits—our best measure of their tax avoidance gymnastics—hasn’t
budged from the prevailing trend.”).
253. Clausing, supra note 248, at 29 (describing a limited effect of the corporate rate reduction on profit shifting “since most profit shifting occurs with
respect to the lowest taxed countries, and 21 percent is still well above that
threshold”); Setser, supra note 252 (“Why would any multinational corporation
pay America’s 21 percent tax rate when it could pay the new ‘global minimum’
rate of 10.5 percent on profits shifted to tax havens, particularly when there
are few restrictions on how money can be moved around a company and its
foreign subsidiaries?”); see also, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 251,
at 125 (“Because tax havens outside the United States will continue to have
relatively low tax rates, CBO projects that most IP currently located there will
remain there. For newly created or future IP, the changes resulting from the
tax act and the fixed costs of transferring IP to foreign affiliates will probably
deter some small amount of profit shifting.”).
TO
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investment by MNCs may not be particularly sensitive to tax
changes.254 In other words, this evidence suggests that domestic and foreign real investments by MNCs are also not close
substitutes. This phenomenon in part explains why, when
evaluating the 2017 legislation as a whole, the Congressional
Budget Office finds that by the tenth year after the changes,
when the corporate rate cut is the only significant tax cut still
in place, Gross National Product—the value of production attributable to U.S. nationals—would increase by merely 0.1%.255
Policymakers also have other options to encourage domestic investments that are likely to more directly incentivize investment at a lower revenue loss than through a broad corporate
rate reduction, and without introducing downward pressure on
tax rates in other parts of the system. One example of such a
policy is expensing of new capital investments.256
254. See Kimberly A. Clausing, In Search of Corporate Tax Incidence, 65
TAX L. REV. 433, 455 (2012) (concluding based on a cross-sectional study of
countries and corporate tax rates that “there is no evidence that lower tax
countries experience greater growth (or lesser declines) in gross fixed capital
formation relative to GDP”); see also Paul Krugman, Opinion, Tax Cuts and
Leprechauns (Wonkish), N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/06/15/opinion/tax-cuts-and-leprechauns-wonkish.html [https://perma.cc/
L52X-2CX4] (“Multinational corporations move profits—as reported—around
based on tax considerations; actual capital, and hence actual economic activity, not so much.”).
255. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, LETTER TO THE HONORABLE CHRIS VAN
HOLLEN, RE: EFFECTS OF THE 2017 TAX ACT ON INCOME ACCRUING TO FOREIGN INVESTORS 1 (2018), https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/115th-congress
-2017-2018/reports/53772-2017taxacteffectsonincome.pdf [https://perma.cc/
NJT6-SSMN]. This finding reflects a slightly increased capital stock but also
subtracts out increased payments to foreign investors. Alan Auerbach suggests, however, that the effects on economic welfare in the United States may
be more significant, if still somewhat modest. See Auerbach, supra note 138, at
115–16. Auerbach in fact cites CBO results as in part supporting this. Id. In
part, this is because Auerbach focuses on increases in domestic product, which
includes the increased income of foreign investors, as opposed to national
product, which focuses on the incomes of U.S. nationals. In evaluating the
benefits of a corporate rate cut in a unilateral reform by the United States,
national product may be the more relevant metric.
256. For instance, Jason Furman and Robert Barro estimate that simply
extending 50% bonus depreciation for equipment might have done more to
boost output at one-sixth of the cost of the changes in the 2017 legislation.
Robert J. Barro & Jason Furman, Macroeconomic Effects of the 2017 Tax Reform, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, Spring 2018, at 257, 304. Importantly, Furman and Barro explicitly do not account for the effect of the
change in relative tax rates between the United States and other countries,
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The corporate rate cut has likely only modestly reduced
shifting of profits and investment out of the United States, but
also preferenced a large additional portion of the corporate income tax base that would not have shifted abroad otherwise. In
2013, corporations reported approximately $1.3 trillion in net
taxable income.257 The corporate rate reduction extends this
benefit of a 14% tax cut across the entire corporate taxable
base, cutting revenues by almost $150 billion per year.258 For
the reasons described in the abstract presentation above,259 a
properly targeted rate reduction on the smaller tranche of MNC
income that was in fact subject to profits shifting or shifting of
investment locale within that rate range would have properly
applied the neutrality principle, and thereby could have lowered the marginal efficiency cost of taxation while limiting additional revenue loss.260 The broader and mistargeted corporate
and focus only on marginal tax rates in the United States and their effects on
capital accumulation. They acknowledge that the relative tax rates might matter for real activity, but conclude the effect of the 2017 legislation on this margin—after taking into account both the rate cut and other international provisions—is ambiguous. See id. at 296–97 (“The impact of all these changes on
reported income is less ambiguous and is likely to be positive as reported income is shifted back to the United States. This change would, however, not be
associated with actual economic activity . . . .”). Others have argued that expensing may not be the most effective method to encourage new business investment. See, e.g., Lily L. Batchelder, Accounting for Behavioral Considerations in Business Tax Reform: The Case of Expensing (Jan. 25, 2017) (working
paper), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2904885 (arguing
that rate reductions may be more salient and therefore more effective means
of incentivizing investment).
257. JOHN A. KOSKINEN ET AL., REVENUE SERV., 2013 STATISTICS OF INCOME: CORPORATION INCOME TAX RETURNS 2 (2013), https://www.irs.gov/
pub/irs-soi/13coccr.pdf [https://perma.cc/AR7W-MPRC].
258. Of course, the 2017 tax legislation also included some corporate base
broadening measures, such as the limitation on interest expense deductions
under I.R.C. § 163(j) (2017), which may be independently justified. This discussion focuses on the particular effect of the corporate rate cut.
259. Supra Part II.B.1.
260. For example, a “patent box” regime could achieve this function by limiting the preference to a narrow category of mobile income. See Bernard
Knight & Goud Maragni, It Is Time for the United States To Implement a Patent Box Tax Regime To Encourage Domestic Manufacturing, 19 STAN. J.L.
BUS. & FIN. 39, 47–48 (2013). For a discussion of the potential challenges with
implementing a patent box regime, including the potential of “downward pressure on international anti-avoidance standards,” see Lilian V. Faulhaber, The
Luxembourg Effect: Patent Boxes and the Limits of International Cooperation,
101 MINN. L. REV. 1641, 1645 (2017). Commentators have noted that the FDII
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rate reduction, however, will generate additional revenue costs
which Congress will have to make up through tax increases
elsewhere, while at the same time increasing the marginal efficiency cost from those other taxes.
Further, as described above, mistargeted preferences have
the effect of increasing the amount of socially costly and revenue-losing substitution from higher- to lower-taxed activity by
preferencing a broader range of activities which may then serve
as substitutes for other activities in the residual higher-taxed
base.261 In this case, an expansion of the preference for all corporate income can increase the elasticity of taxable income—
and therefore the marginal efficiency cost of higher rates—for
all non-corporate income that can substitute into the corporate
system.
In original analysis conducted for this Article, estimators
at the Penn-Wharton Budget Model calculate that, absent the
changes in 2017 legislation, taxpayers with income in excess of
$500,000 would have earned approximately $530 billion in ordinary pass-through income in 2018, and almost all of that
would have been higher-taxed if it were instead taxed in the
corporate system.262 With a 21% corporate rate (and absent
Section 199A), however, roughly 85% of that income tax base,
or over $450 billion, would now face lower tax rates in the corporate system than in the pass-through system.263 With Section
199A in place, nearly 40% of this tax base would switch from
facing lower rates in the pass-through system to lower rates in
regime, described supra note 97 and accompanying text, operates similarly to
a patent box. See KYLE POMERLEAU, TAX FOUND., A HYBRID APPROACH: THE
TREATMENT OF FOREIGN PROFITS UNDER THE TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT 13
(2018), https://taxfoundation.org/treatment-foreign-profits-tax-cuts-jobs-act/
[https://perma.cc/J9NX-QWSZ]. Finally, policymakers may be constrained
from preferencing some forms of mobile corporate income if such rules constituted export subsidies that violated international trade obligations. See Kamin
et al., supra note 25, at 1499–1503 (discussing the possibility that the FDII
regime violates WTO agreements).
261. See supra Part II.B.2.
262. E-mail from Richard Prisinzano, Senior Economist, Penn Wharton
Budget Model, to David Kamin, Professor of Law, N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law (Oct.
5, 2018, 3:56 PM EST) (on file with authors) [hereinafter Oct. 5 Prisinzano Email]; Feb. 13 Ricco E-mail, supra note 28.
263. These new estimates from Penn-Wharton assume that each firm distributes approximately half its annual profits as dividends. Oct. 5 Prisinzano
E-mail, supra note 262. Of course, the proportion of profits distributed by each
firm will vary with their unique economic circumstances.
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the corporate system.264 As a result, the corporate rate reduction—if it is retained—could result in significant shifting over
time from the pass-through to the corporate systems.265
As described above, Congress could have also addressed
the problem of profit shifting by MNCs in other ways that
264. Id.
265. The amount of shifting from the pass-through to the corporate systems will depend on the sensitivity of the choice of entity decisions to the tax
rate differential between the systems. Empirical studies of this question in the
late 1990s suggested that choice of entity decisions were relatively insensitive
to the tax rate differential. See, e.g., Austan Goolsbee, Taxes, Organizational
Form, and the Deadweight Loss of the Corporate Income Tax, 69 J. PUB. ECON.
143, 150–51 (1998) (“The evidence indicates that taxes played a statistically
significant role in organizational form decisions from 1900–1939 but the magnitude was quite small.”); Jeffrey K. Mackie-Mason & Roger H. Gordon, How
Much Do Taxes Discourage Incorporation?, 52 J. FIN. 477, 478 (1997) (“The
measured effects are relatively small . . . .”). However, those findings also included the responses of publicly-traded firms—which may be relatively insensitive to the tax rate differential. As a result, these findings are not good
guides for assessing the sensitivity of current pass-throughs to changes in the
tax rate differential, since most pass-throughs are closely-held firms. See Karin Edmark & Roger H. Gordon, The Choice of Organizational Form by Closely-Held Firms in Sweden: Tax Versus Non-Tax Determinants, 22 INDUS. &
CORP. CHANGE 219, 222 (2013) (“All of these studies, though, use aggregated . . . data, thereby including widely held firms that have a clear choice of organizational form as well as closely-held firms where the choice can depend
much more on particular tax and non-tax factors.”). Subsequent studies focused on closely-held firms found much greater sensitivity to the tax rate differential. See Edmark & Gordon, supra, at 223 (finding large effects of tax
rates on choice of entity in Sweden among closely-held firms); Austan Goolsbee, The Impact of the Corporate Income Tax: Evidence from State Organizational Form Data, 88 J. PUB. ECON. 2283, 2284 (2004) (finding sensitivity to
tax rates in the retail sector—where firms tend to be closely held—between
five and fifteen or more times greater than in the previous studies). These empirical studies are also limited by the fact that that sensitivity to tax rate differentials may also depend on the particular rate environment and choice of
entity rules at the time. For instance, a further increase in individual income
tax rates could result in relationships between the systems not reflected in
these prior studies. See Richard Prisinzano & James Pearce, Tax-Based
Switching of Business Income 11, 19 (Penn Wharton Budget Model, Working
Paper No. 2018-2, 2018), http://budgetmodel.wharton.upenn.edu/issues/2018/3/
16/w2018-2 [https://perma.cc/7BGU-HX76]. In light of the possible limitations
of these earlier findings in the current rate environment, we use data from the
Penn Wharton Budget Model to help illustrate the magnitude of the passthrough income that could shift to the corporate system in response to higher
individual rates, even though the empirical work to date doesn’t provide a definite answer to exactly how much income will shift in response to particular
rate differentials.
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would have avoided these structural pressures on the remainder of the tax base. The 2017 tax legislation in fact introduced
base-protection measures meant to target the types of tax
planning activities that tend to shift profits out of this country,
and Congress may be able to improve these rules.266
In sum, Congress opted for a broad-based corporate rate
reduction, which largely failed to solve the problem of profit
shifting by MNCs and likely had a relatively muted effect on
investment. At the same time, the change introduced a new
preference that increased the efficiency cost of taxation in the
income tax system and reduced the revenue raised at any given
rate in the individual income tax. This effect, combined with
the political economy constraints described above, threatens to
undermine the overall progressivity of the system and progressive reforms to the individual income tax in particular.
To describe this dynamic somewhat differently, proponents
of the large corporate rate reduction have not answered the
question of how they envision this reform interacting with the
individual income tax. This omission is troubling within the
confines of an optimal income tax analysis—since it increases
the efficiency loss associated with raising revenue. It is even
more problematic, however, in light of political economy constraints and the likelihood that revenue lost to the corporate
rate cut will not be made up with higher individual rates for
the reasons described in Part III. A low corporate rate thus
threatens to put the tax system on a path toward less progressivity overall.
B. REEVALUATING SECTION 199A
Our analysis also suggests a somewhat more nuanced assessment of the Section 199A pass-through deduction. As we
and others have suggested in previous work, the provision is a
policy mistake.267 Reaching that conclusion, however, requires
seriously considering the trade-offs in introducing a new preference in response to an existing preference. Further, the harm
from Section 199A is ultimately different from—and worse
than—the harm the previous literature has described. The progressivity ratchet explains why Section 199A is likely to result

266. See supra notes 98–99; infra notes 308–13 and accompanying text.
267. See supra Part I.C.1.
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in more than just immediate revenue loss and unnecessary
complexity, but also a less progressive system over time.
As described in Part II, it is possible in theory for a new
preference to reduce harms from a pre-existing preference. In
this case, Section 199A could be responsive to the preference for
corporate income (which is itself a poorly targeted preference to
address international pressures). If Section 199A were in fact
well-targeted on activity that would otherwise shift to lower
taxes in the corporate system, then Section 199A could be consistent with the neutrality rule and help mitigate some of the
political dynamics generating the progressivity ratchet as a result of the corporate rate reduction.
In this case, assessing the wisdom of Section 199A requires, first, evaluating the legal rules defining the availability
of the preference and whether these rules preference activities
that would otherwise substitute to lower rates in the corporate
system.268 Section 199A surely mitigated some such substitution and also avoided preferencing some activities that could
not have taken advantage of the corporate system. The original
calculations performed for this Article by analysts at the Penn
Wharton Budget Model indicate that, as of 2018, approximately
$200 billion of pass-through profits from taxpayers earning
over $500,000 wouldn’t face a tax incentive to shift to the corporate system with Section 199A in place, as compared to a tax
system without it.269 Perhaps more importantly, they estimate
that many taxpayers in this income range benefiting from Section 199A may now pay tax at rates close to what they would
pay in the corporate system.270 Thus, Section 199A likely discouraged some revenue-losing and costly substitution as a result.
Some of the legal rules limiting access to Section 199A will
in fact exclude taxpayers who could not easily substitute to the
corporate system. For instance, employees—who do not qualify

268. See supra Part II.B.2.
269. See Oct. 5 Prisinzano E-mail, supra note 262.
270. See Prisinzano & Pearce, supra note 265, at 20. Specifically, the passthrough profits of taxpayers benefiting from Section 199A and earning more
than $500,000 would, on average, face a tax rate only about 1% lower than
profits of these taxpayers earned in the corporate system, assuming the corporation distributed an average proportion of its earnings. Authors’ calculations
based on the Penn Wharton Budget Model. Id.
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for Section 199A271—could also not readily take advantage of
corporate form and avoid the second layer of tax in that system,
since personal holding company and retained earnings rules
would be significant barriers for them.272 Section 199A’s requirement that firms owned by high-income individuals must
have employee wages, tangible investments, or a combination
thereof273 might also be seen as excluding from the Section
199A benefit firms that would have trouble justifying retaining
earnings in the corporate system.274
In other cases, however, Section 199A replicated the corporate rate reduction’s mistake of failing to properly target mobile
MNC income, and preferenced a sector of the tax base that
could not have otherwise benefitted from the corporate rate reduction. This consequence may be inevitable, to a degree, in the
case of any pass-through preference, regardless of how it is designed. Congress cannot easily design rules that target taxpayers and activities which would otherwise substitute into lower
tax rates in a different tax system without simply replicating
the exact same system—and, thus, the exact same substitution
that Congress is attempting to mitigate. For instance, serviceoriented partnerships might have trouble restructuring their
profit-sharing arrangements within a corporate structure because partners may be rewarded different shares of profits each
year depending on their productivity275—and yet such partner271. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
272. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
273. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
274. Specifically, firms without significant numbers of employees or tangible investments would likely have a harder time on average than other firms
avoiding the accumulated earnings tax if profits are retained. For a brief description of the tax, see supra note 68 and accompanying text. Without operations involving investment in human or physical capital in the firm, companies
might not be able to justify retaining a substantial share of profits for “reasonable needs” of the business.
275. These service businesses would first encounter the personal holding
company rules and the surtax that could apply to income retained from “personal service contracts.” See supra note 67 and accompanying text. These rules
can be avoided, however, if the firm has enough owners or the contracts do not
specify which individuals will provide the services. See supra note 70. The
more challenging issue might be awarding different amounts of compensation
to owners depending on their service but still having those profits characterized as corporate profits retained in the firm. The risk, from the perspective of
the owners, is that—because of the variation in value (with potentially different amounts of stock awarded a given year based on the services performed in
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ships are not wholly barred from accessing the deduction. Instead, Section 199A draws arbitrary distinctions between professional services that receive the deduction and those that do
not, which do not seem to correlate with any distinction between firms that would otherwise shift to the corporate system
and those that would not.276 Section 199A’s mistargeting leads
to windfall gains to many taxpayers who qualify for Section
199A but who would not have substituted to the corporate system and also new opportunities for other taxpayers to plan
their way into Section 199A and avoid the top individual
rates.277
This framework suggests a basic trade-off when assessing
Section 199A: the potential benefit of preventing some taxpayers from shifting into the corporate system versus the potential
costs of granting windfall gains to some taxpayers and introducing additional tax planning opportunities for others. Given
the heterogeneity in tax planning opportunities in the corporate and pass-through systems, the mistargeting effects of Section 199A seems likely to predominate, though the question is
an empirical one.
Further, this framework also shows that the relevant question is not whether Section 199A will, on average, tax eligible
entities at similar tax rates as corporations. “Average rate neutrality” between systems should not be the goal. Rather, the
goal should be treating close substitutes more neutrally, and
Section 199A—by preferencing activities that would not otherwise shift into the corporate system and creating new disparities within the individual income tax system—fails to do that.
In the end, the greatest potential harm of Section 199A—
like the corporate rate cut—may not be the immediate revenue
loss or additional complexity. Rather, the even greater harm
might be from the way in which it constrains policymakers
from raising revenue from the highest income taxpayers
through future reforms. If corporations and pass-through entities retain their current mistargeted preferences, these preferthat year)—this award may be characterized as either a disproportionate distribution (and therefore as a dividend) under I.R.C. §§ 301, 305(b)(2) (2017) or
as employee compensation under I.R.C. § 83 (2017).
276. See supra notes 93, 110–15 and accompanying text. For example,
there is no clear reason why architects or engineers may be more likely to benefit from the corporate system than lawyers and doctors.
277. See supra notes 110–15 and accompanying text.
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ences will serves as barriers to higher rates on the rest of the
tax base.
C. THE CHALLENGE TO PROGRESSIVE TAXATION
The progressivity ratchet also explains the relationship between the changes in the 2017 legislation and proposals to increase the progressivity of the tax system by raising the top
rates on high income taxpayers.
The federal government faces significant additional financing needs. The CBO finds that the government will need to either raise revenue or cut spending by approximately 2% of GDP
starting in 2019 (around $400 billion) just to stabilize the debt
at its current share of GDP over the next three decades.278 That
figure would approximately double if temporary current policies like the expiring tax cuts and relief from the spending sequester are continued.279 Congress may also require additional
funding to fund critical new public investments. For example,
as described above, Representative Ocasio-Cortez proposed a
tax rate increase 70% to specifically raise revenue for responses
to climate change.280 Finally, a more progressive tax system
may be necessary to address economic inequality and its attendant social and political harms.281
Raising top tax rates can help address these policy challenges, but the progressivity ratchet undermines the effectiveness of this response and the likelihood that policymakers
would choose to raise as much as they would otherwise from
the highest income taxpayers. Because of the progressivity
ratchet, the structure of the 2017 tax legislation will obstruct
278. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE 2018 LONG-TERM BUDGET OUTLOOK 5
(2018), https://www.cbo.gov/system/files?file=2018-06/53919-2018ltbo.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L4UD-WUSP].
279. The CBO projects that continuing these temporary current policies
would add about 2% of GDP to the deficit by 2028. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE,
THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: 2019 TO 2029, at 107 fig.5-2 (2019),
https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2019-03/54918-Outlook-3.pdf [https://perma
.cc/QP89-ZS7L] (showing deficits under the “alternative fiscal scenario”).
280. Stracqualursi, supra note 6.
281. See, e.g., Income Inequality, OECD, https://data.oecd.org/inequality/
income-inequality.htm [https://perma.cc/ZA8R-RPPN] (comparing inequality
across countries after taxes and transfers and finding that the United States
has among the highest levels of inequality in the OECD and the highest
among the G-7 countries); see also Saez & Zucman, supra note 8; supra note 8
and accompanying text.
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efforts to increase the revenue raised by the highest income
taxpayers through future progressive reforms. Whether future
rate increases finance current commitments, new ones, or curtail economic inequality, the progressivity ratchet will undermine all of these goals and reduce the revenue raising efforts
while increasing the efficiency costs from these increases.
Consider once again the three possible constraints policymakers may face on raising taxes on the wealthy. Because of
the progressivity ratchet, further tax increases in the individual income tax will entail greater efficiency costs, which may
constrain policymakers from raising rates if they face the “efficiency cost constraint.” Similarly, the progressivity ratchet will
result in lower revenue raised at any chosen rate in the individual income tax, whether that rate is the revenuemaximizing rate, in the case of the “revenue-maximizing rate
constraint” or some lower rate determined by the political process, in the case of the “salience of tax rate constraint.” In fact,
if these constraints are particularly confining, the progressivity
ratchet could lead to future regressive tax cuts or cuts to government programs.282
Proposals by Representative Ocasio-Cortez and by economists for higher marginal rates on the wealthy illustrate the
challenge of the progressivity ratchet. Substantially increasing
the top tax rate will raise more revenue from the wealthy at
lower efficiency costs if taxpayers cannot easily shift their activities to preferenced portions of the tax base. While some
commentators have already highlighted how these higher tax
rates may not raise revenue if activity shifts over to the corporate sector,283 the emerging conversation on progressive tax reforms has largely ignored how preferences for business income
may obstruct progressive reforms.284 For example, Diamond
282. For example, the efficiency costs of higher taxes on the wealthy will
increase in the presence of the progressivity ratchet, and politicians may be
sensitive to imposing these costs.
283. For instance, analysts at the Penn-Wharton Budget Model explicitly
considered the potential significance of taxpayers shifting to the corporate system in response to higher individual rates and found large potential shifting
responses. See John Ricco & Rich Prisinzano, The Hidden Revenue Cost of a
70% Top Marginal Rate, PENN WHARTON BUDGET MODEL: ECON. MATTERS
(Jan. 24, 2019), http://budgetmodel.wharton.upenn.edu/issues/2019/1/24/the
-hidden-revenue-cost-of-a-70-top-marginal-rate [https://perma.cc/K5GJ-32X6].
284. Some analysis entirely ignored the ways high income taxpayers could
avoid the tax increase, including by taking greater advantage of the business
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and Saez’s estimates of the optimal top rate depend upon a particular legal framework, which likely does not account for the
types of tax reduction opportunities introduced by the 2017 tax
legislation.285
The progressivity ratchet could significantly limit the revenue raised by higher rates on ordinary income. Before considering the effects of the 2017 tax legislation, taxpayers with income above $500,000 were projected to earn approximately $1.5

preferences. See Jeff Stein, Ocasio-Cortez Wants Higher Taxes on Very Rich
Americans. Here’s How Much Money That Could Raise, WASH. POST:
WONKBLOG (Jan. 5, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/
01/05/ocasio-cortez-wants-higher-taxes-very-rich-americans-heres-how-much
-money-could-that-raise/?utm_term=.82b45331b81e (overlooking corporate tax
rates as a method of avoiding increased marginal income rates). Other analysis did incorporate such avoidance behavior but adopted the same assumptions
used before the 2017 legislation and without seriously considering the ways in
which the combination of a low corporate tax rate and the pass-through deduction might render the earlier assumptions were inapplicable. See Kyle Pomerleau & Huaqun Li, How Much Revenue Would a 70% Top Tax Rate Raise? An
Initial Analysis, TAX FOUND.: TAX POL’Y BLOG (Jan. 14, 2019), https://
taxfoundation.org/70-percent-tax-analysis/#_ftnref4 [https://perma.cc/TGW6
-EHY9]; Ricco & Prisinzano, supra note 283.
285. Diamond and Saez recognize that the revenue-maximizing rate depends on the relevant legal rules. The key variable in their estimate is the
elasticity of taxable income—the sensitivity of the tax base to changes in the
tax rate. See supra Part II.A.1 for further description of this term. There are a
range of possible estimates for that parameter, and Diamond and Saez in fact
calculate a different revenue-maximizing rate of 54% based on an alternative
estimate of the elasticity. They point to changes in the legal framework as potentially explaining some of the variance in elasticity estimates, writing: “the
tax avoidance or evasion component of the elasticity . . . is not an immutable
parameter and can be reduced through base broadening and tax enforcement.”
Diamond & Saez, supra note 7, at 173. As this Article details, the new preferences for corporate and pass-through income are likely to result in significantly higher elasticities in the individual income tax system. Substitution between the individual and corporate systems is not new, but, as described in
Parts IV.A–B, the 2017 law likely substantially increased the volume of income that would shift away from income tax rate increases using the business
preferences. In fact, some of the highest estimates of the elasticity of taxable
income are associated with tax rate changes that, because of the specific legal
frameworks and rates involved, led to substantial shifts in business form. See,
e.g, Emmanuel Saez et al., The Elasticity of Taxable Income with Respect to
Marginal Tax Rates: A Critical Review, 50 J. ECON. LIT. 3, 21 tbl.1, 33–34
(2012) (finding high elasticity of taxable income for the top 1% after individual
income tax rate cuts in 1981 and 1986 and noting that a substantial share of
the effect in 1986 appeared to be a shift from corporations to pass throughs,
and especially to S corporations).
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trillion of ordinary income in 2018.286 Without taking into account any behavioral responses, a 1% increase in the tax rate
on this income would generate approximately $15 billion of additional revenue per year. According to original analysis conducted for this Article by the Penn-Wharton Budget Model,
however, roughly one-third of that ordinary income is in the
form of pass-through profits that were previously taxadvantaged in the pass-through system, and could now shift to
the corporate system in the case of a sufficient rate differential
between two systems.287 If Congress only increases rates in the
individual income tax—and creates a sufficiently high rate differential with the corporate system—much of that pass-through
business income as well as other forms of individual income
could shift to the corporate system, meaning that one-third or
more of that $15 billion per year of potential revenue gain could
dissipate.288 In effect, raising the ordinary income rate without
breaking the progressivity ratchet would leave a diminished residual base of non-business income that, for one reason or another, cannot shift away from this higher rate. Because of the
dynamics described in Part III, it seems unlikely that policymakers would be willing to raise rates enough on the residual

286. Authors’ estimate based on calculations in Feb. 13 Ricco E-mail, supra
note 28, and Oct. 5 Prisinzano E-mail, supra note 262.
287. Feb. 13 Ricco E-mail, supra note 28.
288. One-third may in fact be a low estimate, as a large enough differential
between the individual and corporate rate would probably entail further revenue leakage to the corporate system. Specifically, wage income could potentially also shift from the individual income to corporate system, and these estimates did not account for this possible leakage. As described above, the
corporate anti-abuse rules largely prevent most employees from forming corporations and retaining earnings to avoid the second layer of corporate tax.
See supra note 69. However, if individual income tax rates rise and the corporate rate or dividend rates do not increase commensurately, this dynamic
could create a unique opportunity in the history of the tax rules for taxpayers
to earn income through a corporation, immediately receive a distribution of
the income and pay the second layer of tax, and still achieve significant tax
savings. The “reasonable compensation” requirement could limit shareholderemployees in a corporation from taking advantage of this strategy, but taxpayers have successfully avoided the application of this doctrine in eras with
far less potential tax savings at stake. See U.S. GOVT. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ACTIONS NEEDED TO ADDRESS NONCOMPLIANCE WITH S CORPORATION
TAX RULES 26–29 (2009), https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10195.pdf [https://
perma.cc/3C3N-952K] (describing the substantial difficulty that the IRS has
had in enforcing the “reasonable compensation” doctrine).
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non-preferenced base to make up for the income that has shifted to the preferentially taxed bases.
D. REVERSING THE RATCHET
The progressivity ratchet explains why the corporate rate
reduction should be understood as a core structural failing of
the 2017 tax legislation and an obstacle to future progressive
reforms. This Section describes and compares different options
to “break the ratchet”289 and facilitate future rate increases. It
also situates different reform proposals in the prior literature
within this Article’s framework.
1. Restoring the Relative Corporate Penalty
Congress could break the ratchet by unwinding the structural changes in the 2017 legislation and restoring the prior
status quo of a relative corporate penalty for most taxpayers.290
In this case, Congress could also eliminate Section 199A at a
lower social cost, because fewer pass-through businesses would
otherwise shift into the corporate system. As suggested above,
it is desirable for Congress to eliminate Section 199A even if it
preserves the low corporate rate, but this change could induce
revenue loss and efficiency costs from taxpayers shifting into
the corporate system.291 If Congress raised the corporate rate

289. Of course, Congress can also break the ratchet through a combination
of these options. The discussion that follows isolates the different factors in
order to illustrate and assess the full range of options available to Congress.
290. In this case, a relative “corporate penalty” refers to the case of a higher effective tax on corporate income than on income earned through a passthrough for most taxpayers. Under prior law, even those taxpayers able to entirely eliminate the second individual layer of tax on income earned through a
corporation still faced a top corporate rate that was within the range of top
rate on income earned directly. See supra notes 43–47 and accompanying text.
Restoring the corporate penalty would require increasing the corporate rate to
the same range as the top individual rate of approximately 40.8%. In this case,
most taxpayers have relatively little to gain from earning income through a
corporation rather than directly, under even the most favorable circumstances.
Of course, any particular taxpayers or firms will face different effective rates
in the corporate system, depending on such factors as how regularly the firm
distributes earnings.
291. See supra Part IV.B.
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sufficiently, however, Section 199A would become entirely unnecessary.292
Thus far, policymakers and commentators have not generally embraced restoring the relative corporate penalty from prior law, even among those supporting a more modest corporate
tax rate increase.293 However, the prior world of a relative corporate penalty offered critical advantages over the post-2017
framework. First, for closely-held firms, the corporate system
with a relative penalty was largely irrelevant. These closelyheld firms would, for the most part, not “check the box” to shift
from the pass-through to the corporate system, even if Congress then raised the individual rates. These firms could otherwise shift with relative ease across this margin,294 and a relative corporate penalty which induces them to shift into the
pass-through system would therefore have the effect of treating
close substitutes neutrally.
This scenario would largely reserve the corporate system
for publicly-traded companies that cannot shift to the lower
rates in the pass-through system without losing access to the
public equity markets. The empirical literature indicates—
although the question warrants additional study—that firms
may not be all that sensitive along this margin.295 As a result,
292. That is, in this case Congress would not have any reason to preference
pass-through income, since taxpayers would not have the option of better
treatment under the corporate system.
293. See, e.g., Graetz, supra note 23, at 320 (“Both before and after the legislation, Democrats urged a corporate tax rate of 25% to 28%.”); Jason Furman, Opinion, Repeal and Replace the Trump Tax Cuts, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 25,
2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/repeal-and-replace-the-trump-tax-cuts
-1516925433?mod=article_inline (calling for a corporate rate of 25% to 28%
but full elimination of the pass-through deduction); Paul M. Krawzak, House
Democrats’ Budget To Assume Corporate Tax Increase, ROLL CALL (Jan. 7,
2019), http://www.rollcall.com/news/politics/house-democrats-budget-to
-assume-corporate-tax-increase [https://perma.cc/9MYT-SPUG] (reporting that
the Democratic House budget resolution would assume a corporate rate of between 25% and 28%).
294. See supra note 265.
295. See supra note 265 for a discussion of this empirical evidence. See also
SHAVIRO, supra note 22, at 32 (“Corporate tax status may . . . be hard to avoid
when prospective investors would value the advantage of access to public capital markets.”); Emily Cauble, Taxing Publicly Traded Entities, 6 COLUM. J.
TAX L. 147, 162–64 (2015) (“Because equity holders have strong non-tax reasons to demand liquidity, entities cannot easily abandon public trading in order to avoid corporate tax treatment.”).
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closely-held and publicly-traded companies may not be close
substitutes.296 Of course, any substitution across this margin—
by companies electing to be closely-held rather than publiclytraded—would entail some revenue loss and social cost.297
Those efficiency costs would include non-tax costs to the business of financing privately rather than through public equity
markets, and any additional costs to society of less transparency in the business sector. Considering that there does not appear to be much substitution along this margin, those costs
may be more desirable, however, than the alternative of allowing all privately-held companies to engage in tax-motivated
planning across the corporate and pass-through systems.
Raising the corporate rate would also increase pressure on
the international margin, which motivated the corporate rate
cut in the 2017 legislation in the first case.298 As described
above, however, taxpayers may not be induced to shift profits
and real investment to the U.S. even after the corporate rate
cut, at least within the range of relative tax rates introduced in
the 2017 legislation.299 The potential cost of any shifting along
the international margin, however, may be desirable in order to
treat other close substitutes—privately-held firms in the corporate and pass-through systems—more neutrally in the tax system. Further, as described below, the corporate penalty could
be combined with other rules more effectively targeted on mobile income, in order to raise revenue while still reducing taxmotivated shifting of profits and investment.300
In addition to likely treating close substitutes more neutrally, the solution of a relative corporate penalty for publiclytraded companies offers the additional benefit of reserving the
corporate system for companies which can take advantage of its
administrative benefits. Scholars justify the corporate system
on the grounds that entity-level taxation is administratively
superior for the largest firms with regularly traded interests.301
A relative corporate penalty required for publicly-traded com296. See Cauble, supra note 295, at 163.
297. See SHAVIRO, supra note 22, at 33 (“[I]f the tax system penalizes use of
the corporate form, businesses may end up being discouraged from going public . . . .”).
298. See Graetz, supra note 23, at 326–27.
299. See supra notes 249–57 and accompanying text.
300. See infra note 312 and accompanying text.
301. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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panies would align the corporate system with this rationale,
while also mitigating the ratchet and limiting the systemic consequences for the rest of the tax system.
2. Rule-Based Solutions
Restoring the corporate penalty would mitigate the ratchet
by effectively reserving the corporate system for publicly-traded
companies, and preventing substantial substitution into the
corporate system as individual income tax rates rise. Congress
could also attempt to break the ratchet without restoring the
relative corporate penalty by instead changing the rules governing the business tax system, through different reform options proposed in the prior literature.
These rule-based solutions may be divided into two broad
categories. First, “targeting” rules would maintain preferences
for corporate or pass-through income but seek to more accurately target these preferences to income that would in fact
otherwise shift to other preferences. Alternatively, “neutrality”
rules would instead eliminate or reduce preferences in the tax
law, and consequently apply similar tax rates to foreign and
domestic income as well as corporate and pass-through income
earned by individual taxpayers and firms.
Targeting rules. Targeting rules would change the legal criteria governing which taxpayers can access preferential rates
in the corporate or pass-through systems. Some of these changes would fall under what are often termed “anti-abuse” rules.
For example, Congress might still offer preferential tax rates in
the corporate system but limit access to these preferences.
Congress might attempt to strengthen the rules limiting how
much earnings can be retained (although there are not obvious
ways to do so)302 or restore the rules limiting corporate tax benefits for personal service corporations.303 Similarly, Congress

302. See Glogower, supra note 55, at 965 (describing the challenge in
strengthening the accumulated earnings tax rules without penalizing business
with “a legitimate interest in retaining corporate earnings”).
303. For example, Professor Shaviro has called for reinvigorating the personal service corporation regime as a way of mitigating the effects of a lower
corporate rate. Shaviro, supra note 25, at 54 (“Had Congress continued to object, as it traditionally had, to use of the lower corporate rate to make corporations a convenient tax shelter for non-employee high-earners, it could easily
have used the [personal service corporation] rules to address this issue.”).
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could attempt to preserve the Section 199A preference but improve the rules limiting qualification for the deduction.304
Other targeting rule changes could explicitly limit access to
the corporate system. For example, scholars have proposed limiting the choice of entity through strict qualification rules taxing all closely-held corporations under the pass-through system
and reserving the corporate form for publicly-traded entities.305
This solution would, like the restoration of the corporate penalty, make it substantially harder for closely-held firms to access
the corporate system to achieve tax savings. At the same time,
this change would prevent publicly-traded companies from accessing tax reduction opportunities in the pass-through system.
This solution would prevent firms from shifting between systems and therefore mitigate the progressivity ratchet effect resulting from different tax avoidance opportunities across two
tax systems.
Targeting rules of this variety, if feasible, could improve
the current structure introduced by the 2017 tax legislation
and help narrow mistargeted preferences, but may ultimately
be less desirable than the alternative option of restoring the
relative corporate penalty. On the one hand, these targeting
rules could limit the scope of these preferences and could more
accurately target these preferences on the activities subject to
substitution into other preferences, such as shifting profits and
investment abroad. On the other hand, the targeting may still
preserve the preference for a significant tranche of income that
would not otherwise substitute toward another preference.
For instance, consider a targeting rule limiting corporate
status to publicly-traded firms. This rule could eliminate the
revenue losing substitution of closely-held firms to the corporate sector. Such a rule, however, would not change the fact
that foreign profits and investment are not close substitutes for
U.S. profits and investment at current rates, and that the rate
cut extends to a large domestic corporate tax base. As a result,
many corporations could still enjoy a significant windfall, which
would necessitate higher rates elsewhere in the system (or
304. See generally GREENBERG & KAEDING, supra note 23.
305. See, e.g., Toder, Require Firms To Be Taxed as Pass-Throughs, supra
note 143 (proposal limiting the corporate system to publicly-traded companies). These rules would have a different effect, however, as part of a corporate
integration reform. See infra note 313 and accompanying text.
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spending cuts) without significantly discouraging the shifting of
profits and investment. Targeting rules improving Section
199A would encounter a similar challenge in identifying passthrough taxpayers that are most likely to substitute toward
corporate form, and there are no obvious ways to narrowly target them.
Alternatively, Congress could introduce targeting rules
that explicitly preference a narrow scope of activities—such as
rules that explicitly preference profits considered attributable
to mobile intellectual property.306 In this case, Congress would
improve the targeting by isolating and preferencing the particular activities subject to substitution, rather than by broadly
preferencing all corporate income and then attempting to introduce rules limiting the availability of the preference.307
In the end, the utility of targeting rules will depend on
whether the improved targeting justifies the remaining preferences for corporate and pass-through income, and therefore
more effectively applies the neutrality principle. In many cases
targeting rules may be insufficient and would leave in place
mistargeted preferences that still fail to treat close substitutes
more neutrally, at least as compared to reverting to a relative
corporate rate penalty. At the same time, many of these targeting rules could at least limit the ratchet effect resulting from
the changes in the 2017 legislation, even if they may not be the
most desirable option for policymakers.
Neutrality Rules. Congress could also break the progressivity ratchet by eliminating the margins that potentially justify
additional preferences in the tax system. That is, Congress may
be able to reduce or eliminate an initial preference, instead of
responding to it by introducing additional preferences.
Some of these reforms would maintain the basic role of a
corporate income tax but fundamentally change the treatment

306. See, for example, Knight & Maragni, supra note 260 (describing the
possibility of using a “patent box”), for certain features of the 2017 legislation
designed to address the taxation of mobile corporate profits.
307. That is, even a broad preference that is subsequently narrowed
through eligibility rules could still unnecessarily preference a large portion of
the tax base. Narrowing the preference also may fail to effectively target the
remaining preference to activities that would otherwise shift to another preferenced based, and could disallow the preference for activities that are in fact
susceptible to shifting.
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of foreign income in that system.308 For example, the 2017 tax
legislation implemented some of these reforms through the
GILTI and BEAT rules which, respectively, imposed a global
minimum tax on foreign income and sought to address profit
shifting out of the United States by both U.S. and foreign
firms.309 Congress could retain, and possibly improve these
rules,310 to limit the incentive for global profit shifting. These
rules would treat MNC profits reported domestically and
abroad more neutrally, and if successful, could then allow for a
higher rate on other corporate income and on individual income.311 These measures could also be combined with a relative
corporate tax penalty, to both reduce substitution across the international margin and between the domestic pass-through and
corporate systems.312
Other “neutrality rule” changes would fundamentally reform the corporate system and shift the economic locus of taxation from the corporation to individual shareholders through
different methods of corporate integration.313 These proposals
308. Prior works on corporate income tax reform have similarly suggested
that preferencing certain forms of mobile corporate income could allow for
higher rates—while minimizing efficiency costs—on the remainder of the corporate tax base. See, e.g., SIR JAMES MIRRLEES ET AL., TAX BY DESIGN: THE
MIRRLEES REVIEW 440 (2011) (suggesting the efficiency benefits from taxing
highly mobile corporate rents at lower rates than location specific rents); Michael Keen, Preferential Regimes Can Make Tax Competition Less Harmful,
54(4) NAT’L TAX J. 757, 757 (2001) (arguing that preferential tax regimes can
enable countries “to confine their most aggressive tax competition to particular parts of the tax system”).
309. See supra notes 98–99 and accompanying text.
310. See, e.g., Kamin et al., supra note 25, at 1496–97 (arguing that the
GILTI rules could be improved by adopting a “per-country minimum tax rather than one done on a global basis”).
311. As described supra notes 257–59 and accompanying text, however,
these pressures may be exaggerated in all events.
312. In this case, the neutrality rule could address the international margin between domestic and foreign income while the relative corporate penalty
could address the domestic margin between the corporate and pass-through
systems. But see the possible obstacles to these reforms described supra note
260. See also MIRRLEES ET AL., supra note 308, at 444 (describing the “practical difficulties” and potential violation of international agreements in preferencing mobile forms of income).
313. See, e.g., U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE TAX SYSTEMS: TAXING BUSINESS INCOME ONCE 1–14
(1992) (describing the distortions caused by the separate corporate tax and
how they would be alleviated through corporate integration); ERIC TODER &
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have multiple aims. First, U.S. individuals—because they are
taxed on their worldwide income—cannot readily shift income
across borders to try to avoid U.S. rates.314 As a result, these
reforms could reduce the preference for foreign income. Second,
these reforms would help align the tax rates and preferences
across the corporate and pass-through systems, thus reducing
opportunities for revenue-losing substitution within the domestic income tax base.315
This second set of neutrality rules involve much more dramatic changes to the business tax system and could treat income more neutrally, both across borders and across business
forms. This approach, however, may present other disadvantages. For instance, recent research has shown that a significant share of corporate stock is held by non-taxable people
or entities, such as retirement accounts, pension funds, and

ALAN D. VIARD, URBAN-BROOKINGS TAX POLICY CTR., A PROPOSAL TO REFORM
THE TAXATION OF CORPORATE INCOME 17–18 (2016), https://www
.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/2000817-a
-proposal-to-reform-the-taxation-of-corporate-income.pdf [https://perma.cc/
XT2P-LLV9] (proposing to tax interests in publicly-traded corporations at the
individual level through “mark-to-market taxation” and interests in closelyheld corporations in the same manner as interests in pass-throughs); Michael
J. Graetz & Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Integration of Corporate and Individual Income Taxes: An Introduction, 84 TAX NOTES 1767, 1770 (1999) (describing tax
policy choices in integrating corporate and individual income tax schemes and
discussing economic ramifications that would result); Harry Grubert & Rosanne Altshuler, Shifting the Burden of Taxation from the Corporate to the
Personal Level and Getting the Corporate Tax Down to 15 Percent, 69 NAT’L
TAX J. 633, 658–62 (2016) (proposing to tax corporate income at a low 15% rate
and then imposing an interest charge on deferred tax liabilities). To address
the global pressures on tax revenues from tax competition, Professor AviYonah has also proposed a coordinated and uniform international withholding
tax on portfolio investments. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573,
1666–70 (2000).
314. See Grubert & Altshuler, supra note 313, at 665 (describing how shifting the tax burden from the corporate to the individual sector would diminish
the benefits from income shifting).
315. That is, the various corporate integration proposals may be understood as proper applications of the “neutrality principle” in contrast to the mistaken goal of seeking average neutrality across entities in the 2017 tax legislation. See, e.g., DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, supra note 313, at 12 (“Integration
would reduce and in some cases eliminate the distortions of business decisions . . . by coordinating the individual and corporate income tax systems . . . .”).
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foreigners.316 The corporate system offers the benefit of indirectly taxing these otherwise tax exempt investors.317 Shifting
the burden from the corporation to the owners through integration may also require reforming the taxation of these exempt
taxpayers.318
In the end, weighing these options—and particularly the
choice between a relative corporate penalty and fundamental
neutrality rule reforms—may also depend on the rate levels
across the tax system as a whole. For example, assume Congress implemented a top individual rate of approximately 70%
in accordance with Representative Ocasio-Cortez’s proposal,319
and then raised the corporate rate to within the range of 60–
70% to preserve a relative corporate penalty for most taxpayers. These higher rates could have a much more significant effect on corporate investment across borders and may induce
other tax avoidance behaviors not undertaken at current
rates.320 In this scenario, the neutrality rule option—and, in
particular, some form of corporate integration—may be more
desirable, even if a shift to taxing individual shareholders rather than corporate income might entail additional challenges,
such as the treatment of tax exempt investors. Alternatively, in
a tax system with lower rate levels (though still higher than
under the 2017 legislation), simply reverting to a relative corporate tax penalty may be a more desirable method of breaking
the ratchet.

316. See Steven M. Rosenthal & Lydia S. Austin, The Dwindling Taxable
Share of U.S. Corporate Stock, 151 TAX NOTES 923, 923 (2016) (estimating
“that the share of U.S. corporate stock held in taxable accounts fell more than
two-thirds over the last 50 years, from 83.6 percent in 1965 to 24.2 percent in
2015”).
317. See SHAVIRO, supra note 22, at 155–56 (discussing the question of how
tax-exempt shareholders should be treated under corporate integration).
318. Eric Toder and Alan Viard suggest, for example, imposing a 15% tax
paid on interest to tax exempt institutions and retirement plans, “to limit
the . . . benefit these taxpayers receive from a lower corporate tax rate.”
TODER & VIARD, supra note 313, at 2.
319. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
320. MNCs still engage in significant profit shifting even with lower corporate rates, and therefore may not shift significantly more profits at even higher rates. See Clausing, supra note 129, at 29.
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CONCLUSION
The progressivity ratchet begins with a basic insight from
the tax policy literature. A preference for one portion of the tax
base can undermine the effectiveness of tax increases on other
portions of the base. Because of the preference, the tax increases will raise less revenue at a higher efficiency cost. As a result,
policymakers will be limited in their ability to progressively
raise more revenue from the wealthiest taxpayers if they face
one or more of certain political constraints in raising taxes on
the wealthy: (1) a concern with the efficiency costs of taxation;
(2) challenges to raising revenue through further increases to
the top rates; or (3) a decision to tax the wealthy at the revenue
maximizing rates.
In turn, the neutrality principle suggests that policymakers can mitigate the costs and revenue loss from taxation by
treating close substitutes neutrally. This Article builds on these
principles to evaluate the case of a new tax preference introduced as a response to an initial preference and to explain why
the legal rules defining the new preference will determine
whether it mitigates or compounds the tax ratchet from the initial preference.
This Article then applies this framework to reevaluate the
new preferences for business income in the 2017 tax legislation
and to explain why these changes will obstruct future progressive income tax reforms. Many commentators criticized the design of the new “pass-through” deduction but praised or tacitly
accepted the corporate rate cut as a response to international
pressures. This Article’s framework offers an alternative understanding of these changes and explains why they both represent similar mistakes that will compound the progressivity
ratchet and limit the revenue raising potential from future rate
increases on taxpayers with the highest incomes.
Understanding the 2017 tax legislation through the lens of
the progressivity ratchet also suggests the possible paths forward. This Article explains how policymakers can weigh different options to correct the mistakes in the 2017 legislation and
thereby enable future progressive income tax reforms.

